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Properly speaking, international criminal responsibility is not a new 
chapter of public international law, but rather the recent revival of an old 
chapter of the Law of Nations. In the recent past, we have seen the 
emergence of ad hoc international criminal tribunals that is with a limited 
competence, as established in their statutes.(1) Instead, today’s International 
Criminal Court enjoys, within its statutory (treaty) limits, a general 
jurisdiction; it is thus a permanent organ of a general character, mirroring 
the ICJ in matters of international criminal law. It will also be in charge of the 
international criminal responsibility of the individuals. 
In contrast with the two previous approaches, based on ‘right’, we will 
deal here with ‘obligations’ that are bestowed upon the individual, that is, 
international obligations not to commit some acts characterized as crimina 
iuris gentium. PIL deals with the individual by prohibiting the perpetration of 
such crimes. The individual is therefore construed as the passive subject 
within international legal relations; he must account – before municipal and 
international courts alike – for his misdeeds (violation of international 
obligations) committed against States as well as other individuals.(2) Thus, if, 
                                      
(1) For instance, Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
(2) It ought to be noted that individual’s international criminal responsibility is not in 
fact incurred vis-à-vis those persons who have actually suffered (or were affected) by 
the perpetration of his crime. Here we find again, yet with inverted roles, the same 
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from the angle of international human rights protection, responsibility 
involved an active personality, in this case the personality is deemed to be 
passive. 
Aside from international “crimes” of the States whose existence remains 
to be carefully considered,(3) international law contemplates the existence of 
certain categories of crimes committed by individuals acting either 
individually, or as State organs. Still, only a few of these violations are 
susceptible to be prosecuted and punished on the international plane while 
others are only prosecuted and punished by national jurisdictions. 
The revolutionary developments which have punctuated this province of 
PIL from the second half of the Twentieth century onwards, severely 
stepping into one of the core elements of the State reserved domain (of 
criminal repression), show that the individual must also be considered as an 
international subject in this domain, as long as he is directly prosecuted and 
tried by an international judiciary mechanism.  
It is indeed on the plane of international punishment of these crimes that 
the individual arose in international law as a bearer of international 
obligations, and as such as a subject of international law.(4) Finally, it is 
important to note that an individual’s criminal responsibility does not affect, 
in any way, the eventual concomitant international responsibility of the 
State, on the contrary this “duality of responsibility continues to be a 
constant feature of international law”.(5) Indeed, if its conduct can be 
                                                                                                    
equation in the previous two perspectives, i.e. State or the International Community 
(injured party) and individual (defaulting party).  
(3) See: G. Distefano, Fundamentals of Public International Law. A Sketch of the 
International Legal Order, Leiden, 2019, pp. 700-702. 
(4) See: G. Balladore Pallieri, 1962, Diritto internazionale pubblico, pp. 221-222; S. 
Romano, Corso di diritto internazionale 1933, pp. 76-77; R. Quadri, 1968, pp. 407-408 
(since the condition this famous jurist set forward – i.e. the existence of international 
organs endowed with the power to repress on the international plane these 
international crimes – has henceforth been fulfilled); A. Cassese,  
International Law, 2001, pp. 79-81; A. Verdross, B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 
1984, §§ 430-443 (pp. 260-267);  
(5) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 2007, § 173 (at 116). See Article 25 § 4 of the ICC Statute as well as Article 
58 IR 2001, which recites: ““These articles are without prejudice to any question of the 
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attributed to a State in one way or another,(6) then the State’s international 
responsibility can be engaged. Henceforth, there will be two international 
responsibility (the individual’s and the State’s) within the international legal 
order which could give rise to different types of repression and forms of 
sanctions.(7)  
Keywords: international criminal responsibility, international criminal 
law, war crimes, crimes against humanity, crime of aggression, crime of 
genocide, International Criminal Court, ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals . 
 
I. The International Criminalization of Individuals’ Conducts: A Very 
Short Story 
I.1. The Forerunners 
Keeping always in mind that any periodization – and all the more a 
succinct one – is inevitably arbitrary, one may start from 1268 when the 
grandson of the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Sicily Frederick II, 
Conradin of Hohenstaufen – the last heir of his dynasty – was beheaded in 
Naples after having tried to enforce his legitimate rights over the Kingdom. 
In the wake of his defeat at Tagliacozzo, he was swiftly tried (in fact a sham 
trial) for having waged an “unjust war” (hence an alleged breach of “ius ad 
bellum” set of rules)(8) against Charles of Anjou, at that time papal-
appointed king, and was accordingly executed. In 1474, P. von Haggenbach, 
following the rebellion of the imperial town of Breisach (Alsace, France), was 
arrested, tried (presumably, again, an unfair trial orchestrated by the 
imperial cities of Strasburg, Basel, Colmar and Selestat) and beheaded for 
having infringed the authority of the Emperor. Even earlier, and more 
generally, the Law of Nations provided for universal jurisdiction of 
                                                                                                    
individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a 
State.” 
(6) See: G: Distefano, 2019, pp. 653-695. 
(7) “The State, and those acting on its behalf, bear criminal responsibility for such 
violations of international law as by reason of their gravity, their ruthlessness, and 
their contempt for human life place them within the category of criminal acts as 
generally understood in the law of civilized countries”, Oppenheim’s International Law, 
8th ed. (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht), p. 355.  
(8) See: G. Distefano, “Use of Force”, Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed 
Conflict, ed. by A. Clapham & P. Gaeta, Oxford, 2014, pp. 545-573 
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prosecution and trial against pirates, admittedly qualified as “hostis humani 
generis”,(9) i.e. enemies to the whole mankind. The scenario of piracy 
illustrates vividly one of the distinctive features of (future) international 
crimes to the extent that the jurisdictional criterion, allowing prosecution 
and trial by all States whosoever, is disconnected from all nexus, be it 
territorial or personal. As it has been observed, piracy is an “assault upon 
vessels navigated on the high seas, committed animo furandi i.e. with the 
intention to steal, whether the robbery of forcible depredation be effected 
or not, and whether or it be accompanied by murder or personal injury”.(10) 
The very concept of an international crime underlies the act of piracy in the 
high seas since, as an authority rightly emphasized, the juridical 
consequence of piracy is the “denationalization”(11) of the pirate vessel, i.e. it 
falls within the jurisdiction of any State. 
Jurisprudence at large acknowledges that these are the forerunners of 
international criminal trials (“delicta iuris gentium”); in effect, one has to 
stress that in both cases, as in others which will follow, the tribunals were 
not at all international but municipal, a national authority standing behind 
them a bestowing to them the required legality. This can be explained since 
a rudimentary monism between international and municipal orders exist at 
that time and persisted for some time until at least the beginning of the 
XVIII Century.  
In effect, the true forerunners of international criminal law and hence of 
a genuine international punishment date back to the end of WWI, as we will 
see in the following chapter.  However, even before this timeline, doctrine 
                                      
(9) Quite revealing, yet in another context, Emer de Vattel attached this formula to 
those individuals who, during a war, “wantonly deprive mankind of these 
monuments of art and models of taste”, The Law of Nations, 1758 (translated from 
French), Book III, IX, § 168.  
(10) Sir Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, 1879, Vol. I (Part II), 
Chapter XX, p. 488; likewise: P. Fiore, IL diritto internazionale codificato, 1909, Articles 
298-300 (p. 192); Th. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law,1911, para. 102 
(pp. 232-237). Modern definition has not changed substantially; see Article 101 
UNCLOS III. This law-making convention provides accordingly for universal jurisdiction 
in the repression of piracy (Article 100). 
(11) F. von Liszt, Le droit international. Exposé systématique, 1928 (translated from 
German), 1928, para. 26 (p. 221). In the same vein: L. Oppenheim, International Law, A 
Treatise, 1912, Vol. 1, para. 278 (pp. 345-346).  
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paved the way to the normative development; it suffices to peruse any of 
the most authoritative handbooks of PIL to notice that international criminal 
(or, synonymously, penal) law features a chapter, let alone a in-depth study 
on this matter.(12) State practice did not lagged, either, and it is especially 
the Laws of War(13) which is furthered thus contributing to the enhancement 
of this branch of PIL. At the normative level – both municipal and, especially, 
international – one may mention the Lieber Code (1863)(14), the 1st Geneva 
Convention (1864)(15), the 1906 Geneva Convention on Wounded and Sick 
Combatants, the The Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) related to the 
conduct of hostilities, as well as the 1925 Geneva Protocol(16), to name only 
a few of them.(17) They all, yet at different degrees, contain embryonic 
elements of international criminal law purporting to punish the individuals 
having breached the obligations contained therein. As the International 
Tribunal in Nurnberg stated in an authoritative way:  
“That International Law imposes duties and liabilities upon 
individuals as well as upon States has long been recognized … Many 
other authorities could be cited, but enough has been said to show 
that individuals can be punished for violations of International Law. 
Crimes against International Law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of International Law be enforced”(18) 
                                      
(12) Gustave Moynier, one of the co-founders of the Red Cross Movement, threw out 
the idea, following the conclusion of 1864 Geneva Convention, to establish a 
permanent international criminal court.  
(13) See: G. Distefano, 2014, pp. 545-547. 
(14) “Instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the field” 
issued by US President Lincoln (General Orders n°100) in order to regulate the use of 
force by US troops (unionists) during the Civil War against the Confederates (thus a 
non-international armed conflict). Several of its provisions set forth the necessary legal 
basis allowing municipal jurisdictions to prosecute and punish offences flowing from 
the breaches of the duties contained therein.  
(15) “Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field”. 
(16) “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”. 
(17) One may also mention in this context the various international agreements 
prohibiting the white slave trade and slavery at large.  
(18) IMT, Judgement of 1st October 1946, pp. 446, 447.  
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I.2. Contemporary  
In a way, the two World Wars have, as it happened in other fields of PIL, 
ignited a process which is still on-going nowadays. Article 227 of the 
Versailles Treaty provided for the incrimination of Guillaume II while at the 
same time sketching the substantive criminal law required to assess his 
conduct. Indeed, Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty considered the German 
Reich Emperor, Guillaume II of Hohenzollern, as guilty of “a supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties”. In the same vein, 
article 228(19) of the same treaty set the obligation for Germany to bring 
before its own jurisdictions(20) any individual allegedly guilty of war crimes, 
flowing from the breach of the so-called “laws and customs of war”.(21) 
Besides, in 1937, alongside with the Convention on the “Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism”(22) the League of Nations (hereafter: LoN) adopted 
                                      
(19) Paragraph 3 of this provision derogated to the ne bis in idem principle of criminal 
law to the extent that it set out that it was to “apply notwithstanding any proceedings 
or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies”. 
(20) In fact, no tribunal was established by Germany pursuant to this obligation; only 
12 German militaries, among 45 selected by the Allies, were eventually tried at Leipzig 
of which six were acquitted whilst the others were sentenced to (only) 4 years of 
detention.  
(21) In 1915, a joint Declaration (GB-F-Russia) contained the formula “crimes against 
humanity”: “In the presence of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and 
civilization, the allied Governments publicly inform the Sublime Porte that they will 
hold personally for the said crimes all members of the Ottoman Government as well as 
those of its agents who are found to be involved in such massacres” (quoted in: R. 
Sarkissian, “The Armenian Genocide: A contextual view of the crime and politics of 
denial”, in The Criminal Law of Genocide. International, Comparative and Contextual 
Aspects, Ashgate, 2009, p. 3; italics added). The three Allied Governments referred at 
the violent and systematic persecution of the Armenian and other Christian 
populations of the Ottoman Empire by the latter government. According to its Art. 
230, “The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the 
persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the 
massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which 
formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914”. However, since the Treaty of 
Sèvres – which never entered into force – was eventually superseded by the Treaty of 
Lausanne (14 July 1923) – which contains no charge of responsibility upon Ottoman 
officials – no punishment ever really took place.  
(22) It ought to be observed incidentally that this Convention contains the first 
international general definition of terrorism through a multilateral convention (Article 
2). 
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the “Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court”, whose 
Article 1 established in fact such a Court. None of them entered into force, 
failing the required number (3!) of ratifications or accessions.  
Later on, in the wake of WWII, two international military tribunals 
(Nuremberg and Tokyo) were instated in order to repress the great Nazis 
and Japanese war criminals.(23) In this regard one has however to make clear 
that while the IMT of Nuremberg(24) was genuinely an international 
jurisdiction since it was established through an international agreement 
concluded between the 4 Allies in Europe (USA, USSR, UK and France),(25) the 
second one, Tokyo, was set up by an unilateral act of the occupying power, 
USA, by virtue of its powers according to the “laws and customs of war”.  
As it will be shown further in the text, all these developments(26) have led 
to a dramatic strengthening and deepening of international criminal law 
both in its substantive and in its institutional dimension. As regards the first 
one, a whole new body of international norms have enabled the 
criminalization of some acts, such as the crime of genocide,(27) war crimes,(28) 
                                      
(23) It must be noted in this regard that the first international attempts to punish 
individual crimes have been carried on by the victors after a major conflict. This 
reminds us that Ancient Greece philosophical thought distinguished between three 
forms of justice: a) Nemesis (i.e. vengeance); b) Dike (ideal form of justice, may be 
embodied by the ICC); c) Themis (the balance between conflicting yet equally relevant 
interests, pursued by the two ad hoc international tribunals set up by the SC).  
(24) London Agreement of 8th August 1945 (i.e. the Constitution of the IMT). 
Alongside with this international jurisdiction, military tribunals were set up by each 
occupying power – in its own specific area of occupation – that were endowed, again 
according to PIL, to prosecute and trial Germany criminals; the latter were also tried by 
German tribunals.  
(25) It was created “for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals of the European Axis” (Article 1). 
(26) It has been wisely observed that contemporary international criminal law fits 
appropriately in the “Law of cooperation approach”: G. Abi-Saab, Cours général de 
droit international public,  
 1987, p. 435.  
(27) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), (2007), §§ 143-201 (at 
103 – 127).  
(28) Cf. i.a. : ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgement of 16 November 1998, §§ 301-
307.  
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crimes against humanity (and torture)(29) and crime of aggression. These 
“new” international crimes have thus accrued to other criminal acts which 
existed before and which were mainly if not exclusively tried by national 
jurisdictions(30) – even though they are territorially disconnected(31) – 
namely: a) piracy in the high seas;(32) b) slavery and slave trade,(33) including 
the historical case of the “white slave trade”;(34) c) trafficking of narcotic d) 
obscene and pornographic publications. In each of these last crimes cases, 
the author of the crime (an individual or a group thereof) is the final 
beneficiary of these international obligations, but the institutional 
mechanisms of repression being merely national, he cannot be considered 
as being the true holder on the international plane. In fact, these crimes are 
bestowed the adjective “international” insofar as their repression is 
extended beyond the traditional jurisdictional nexus (territory and 
nationality of the author/victim); in fact, what happens is the extension of 
States’ jurisdictions thanks to the principle of universal jurisdiction. Hence, 
under these conditions, the mere incrimination under the international legal 
order of these violations does not at all suffice in view of recognizing 
individuals an international legal personality. 
To sum up, it does not go unnoticed that Nuremberg Trial in penetrating 
into the State veil had two effects with regard to the status of individuals in 
PIL: a) on one side it made the individual, as a State organ, personally 
responsible for perpetrating an international crime; b) on the other side, a 
                                      
(29) Cf. i.a. : ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgement of 10 December 1998, 
paras. 142, 158-164. It ought to be underscored from the outset that “torture” is 
admittedly a “discrete crime”, that is to say is a crime by itself without thus requiring a 
nexus either with an armed conflict (torture as a war crime) or with a “widespread or 
systematic attack” (torture as a CAH). Likewise: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., 
2001, paras. 466-483. 
(30) See: Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals, 1953, pp. 208-217.  
(31) See: A. W. Heffter, 1866, § 104 (pp. 201-202).  
(32) P. Fiore, Articles 295-300 (pp. 191-193); H. S. Maine, International Law,1888, p. 
76; Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Vol. 1, § 299 (pp. 746-747); J. C. Bluntschli, 
Le droit international codifié, (translated from German), 1870, Article 343 (p. 194); 
A.W. Heffter, 1866, § 104 (p. 202); W.E. Hall, International Law, 1924, p. 317. 
(33) J. C. Bluntschli, 1870, Article 363 (p. 204); J. Westlake, International Law, 1904, 
Vol. I, p. 253; A.W. Heffter, 1866, § 104 (p. 202).  
(34) F. Despagnet, Cours de droit international public, 1905, §§ 262-263 (pp. 281-283);  
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State has become internationally responsible for violating (nascent) HR vis-
à-vis its own nationals, hence making them true subjects of PIL.(35)  
There are some principles – both of procedural and substantive nature – 
which underlie international criminal law and thus the engagement of an 
individual responsibility thereof. (36) Most, if not all, of them derive from 
municipal law and in this respect their original source may thus be found in 
Article 38 (1) c) ICJ Statute, i.e. the so-called “general principles of Law”.(37) 
 
II. Substantive General Principles of International Criminal Law 
 
II.1.1. General Remarks 
By substantive International Criminal Law is admittedly meant the body 
of rules, some of which plunging their roots quite far in the past, by which 
not only patterns of behaviours are prohibited, but their infringements are 
hereby qualified as crimes, thus leading to a universal punishment. 
Traditionally, one of the most ancient and striking examples of 
“international crime” is that of “piracy in High Seas”(38); in accordance with 
the Latin maxim, they were considered “enemy of Mankind” (“hostis 
humanis generis”), as they put themselves (or tried to) outside and against 
the Law, i.e. thus “Outlaws”. This qualification allowed any State to 
prosecute and punish those who committed such acts; in a nutshell, so went 
                                      
(35) “International law has in the past made some claim that there is a limit to the 
omnipotence of the state and that the individual human being, the ultimate unit of all 
law, is not disentitled to the protection of mankind when the state tramples upon his 
rights in a manner which outrages the conscience of mankind”, British Prosecutor, Trial 
of the Major War Criminals, vol. 19, 471-472.  
(36) “This term international criminal law has at least six different meanings. It may 
be identified with the territorial scope of municipal criminal law. It may be equated 
with internationally authorised municipal criminal law. It may mean municipal criminal 
law common to civilised nations. It may signify international co-operation in the 
administration of municipal criminal law and, finally, stand for international criminal 
law in the material sense of the term”, G. Schwartzenberger, International Law, 3rd. 
ed., 1957, p. 255.  
(37) See: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 559-579. 
(38) According to Art. 11 of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention, any State can 
punish those who commit such acts (the definition of which is given in that same 
provision).  
9
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the application of the universal jurisdiction,(39) according to which the usual 
requirements of criminal law (personal and territorial links) were discarded 
for the purpose of justice.(40) In short, when a State put a pirate on trial, it 
somehow acted as an organ of the International Community as a whole. 
Since then, substantive International Criminal Law has steadfastly 
developed, especially since the end of XIX Century.  
Restraining ourselves to the development occurred since the beginning of 
the last century, one has to stress that they took place within the province 
of the Law of War (including both branches of ius ad bellum and ius in bello), 
notably the outlawing of War (1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact) as well as through 
the furtherance of the “laws and customs of war”, notably the two 1929 
Geneva Conventions (prisoners and wounded and sick).(41) 
IMT in Nuremberg and, on lesser extent, US-established Tokyo Military 
Tribunal have later on dramatically contributed to the enhancement and 
clarification of substantive international criminal law, especially through the 
definition of international crimes, their elements and excuses, etc.  With 
regard to international delinquencies, Article 6 of the IMT Statute 
enumerated the three categories of crimes being prosecuted by this 
jurisdiction; alongside with a) crime against peace and b) war crimes, 
emerges, from the “legal conscience of civilised nations” – one would be 
tempted to say - , “crime against humanity” (lit. c). The latter will generate 
afterwards the crime of genocide, a new crime which will emancipate itself 
as a specific crime from the general category of “crimes against humanity”, 
thanks to the 1948 UN Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. In this context, it is noteworthy to stress that in the light 
of the IMT Statute it is apparent that the crime against peace is not only the 
                                      
(39) This idea had been around for centuries, at least since Grotius who so wrote in the 
middle of Seventeenth century: “We must also know, that Kings, and those who are 
invested with a Power equal to that of Kings, have a Right to exact Punishments, not 
only for Injuries committed against themselves, or their Subjects, but likewise, for 
those which do not peculiarly concern them, but which are, in any Persons 
whatsoever, grievous Violations of the Law of Nature or Nations”, Book II, Chapter XX, 
para. 40.1. 
(40) See: R. Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution 
of Disputes: General course on Public International Law, 1991, at 93-95.  
(41) One might also mention in this connection, the 1927 IDI’s resolution aimed at the 
unification of international penal law.  
10
Journal Sharia and Law, Vol. 2021, No. 85 [2021], Art. 10
https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2021/iss85/10




45                                                                                 [College of  Law UAE University] 
 
 
supreme crime(42) but also that its overarching character means that the 
perpetration of the other two (i.e. ear crimes and crime against humanity) 
depends on its existence. In sum, a nexus must be established between the 
existence of an unlawful war (hence a crime against peace or crime of 
aggression) and either a war crime or a crime against peace; therefore, 
these two crimes were subordinated to the crime against peace so that, 
according to IMT Statute and jurisprudence, they couldn’t exist without and 
outside it.(43) We will see later on that the requirement of a nexus will 
disappear and that nowadays, as illustrated by the ICC Statute, the 
hierarchy, if any, between international crimes has been substantially 
upended (infra II).(44) 
Among other relevant contributions to substantive international criminal 
law, one may also recall the rule according to which “the official positions of 
the defendant shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment” (Article 7). Thus, for the first time ever, bar Emperor 
William II unlucky precedent, by this principle a profound wedge was 
inserted in States’ immunities for acts accomplished by organs in their 
official capacity. In a germane key, another rule provided for the discarding 
of “superior order” as a circumstances precluding responsibility since Article 
8 sets that “the fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may 
be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that 
justice so requires”.  
                                      
(42) “In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war are doing that 
which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules 
of the Hague Convention”, IMT, Judgement of 1st October 1946, p. 445. 
(43) “To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is 
the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it 
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole”, IMT Judgment of 1st October 
1946, p. 421. 
(44) Indeed, ICTR affirmed: “The ICTR Statute does not establish a hierarchy of norms, 
but rather all three offences are presented on an equal footing. While genocide may 
be considered the gravest crime in respect to war crimes and crime against 
humanity”, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 470. True, in this case, 
the tribunal did have no jurisdiction over crime of aggression – the conflict in Rwanda 
having a non-international character – but the listing of international crimes in the ICC 
Statute may nevertheless hint to that hierarchy, if any.  
11
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Furthermore, the development and fortification of international criminal 
law took place thanks to the jurisprudence of the IMT which remained 
nearly until the end of last century the reference for PIL and still represents 
today a landmark achievement. Its lasting contribution appeared so 
conspicuous that already in 1946, UNGA adopted its 95/1 resolution 
whereby it “affirms {that}the principles of international law recognized by 
the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and the judgement of the Tribunal”.(45) 
Moreover, UNGA mandated ILC to study the “desirability and possibility” of 
the establishment of a (permanent) international criminal court as well as to 
clarify substantive international criminal law. After adopting in 1950 a Text 
whereby it stated the “Principles of International Law recognized in the 
Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal”,(46) 
the ILC decided, alas, to adjourn its mandate pending the definition of the 
crime of aggression (i.e. crime against peace). It will be in 1981 only that 
UNGA invited again ILC to resume its work (in abeyance since then).(47) 
Eventually, in 1996 ILC adopted the “Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind”(48) which constituted at that time the most exhaustive 
attempt to reunite under a single text a comprehensive tableau of 
international crimes as well as their definition. The same year UNGA 
adopted a resolution deciding to hold a diplomatic conference aiming at 
establishing an international criminal court.(49) ILC “draft code” formed 
hence the basis of negotiation in Rome of the future Statute of ICC which 
was eventually adopted the 17th July 1998. According to its Article 126(50) the 
Statute entered into force the 1st July 2002 and today 123 States are Parties 
to it. Rome Statute is today the most recent international conventional 
instrument in matters of substantive international criminal law; hence, we 
                                      
(45) Paragraph 1 of the resolution adopted on the 11th December 1946 (“Affirmation 
of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg 
Tribunal”). See also: : M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, pp. 201-205. 
(46) ILC Report to the UNGA, A/5/12, 1950, paras. 13-14. 
(47) UNGA Resolution 36/106 (10 December 1981).  
(48) A/51/10, 1996, Chapter II, paras. 30-50. 
(49) UNGA Resolution 51/207 (17 December 1996); however, one has to wait another 
year for the UNGA to implement its previous resolution (Resolution 52/160 of 15 
December 1997).  
(50) This provision required 60 States’ instruments of ratification and/or accession to 
be deposited for the Statute to enter into force and hence for the establishment of the 
ICC. 
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will refer to it in order to unearth this body of law, keeping nonetheless in 
mind that customary international law may supplement, integrate and even 
modify it.(51) 
  
II.1.2. The Principle of Legality 
 
Also known under the Latin maxim “Nullum crimen sine lege praevia” 
(NCSL), this principle embodies a fundamental requirement of justice: an 
individual act can be criminalized only if at the time it was committed there 
was (already) a rule bestowing this qualification. In the seminal IMT 
judgement France and al. v. Goering and al. (1946), the Tribunal affirmed: 
  
“It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a fundamental 
principle of all law -international and domestic- is that there can be 
no punishment of crime without a pre-existing law: “Nullum crimen 
sine lege; Nulla poena sine lege”.(52) It was submitted that ex post 
facto punishment is abhorent to the law of all civilised nations, that 
no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the time the 
alleged criminal acts were committed, that no statute had defined 
aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed for its commission, 
and no court had been created to try and punish offenders”(53) 
This principle has henceforth been codified in several international 
instruments establishing international criminal jurisdictions(54) and largely 
reflects international(55) and domestic(56) jurisprudence. 
                                      
(51) On the relations between the two principal sources of PIL, see G. Distefano, 2019, 
pp. 369-391.  
(52) This second principle is the corollary of the first one since punishment of an 
individual presupposes his act to be qualified beforehand as “criminal” (hence “Nullum 
crime sine lege”). ICC Statute aptly distinguishes the two principles (infra note 54).  
(53) IMT, judgment of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals. 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 
22 (22nd August, 1946 to 1st October, 1946), p. 444. 
(54) Article 7 (3) ICTY, Articles 22 & 23 ICC, as well as HR instruments: Article 12 (2) 
ICCPR 1966, Article 7 (1) ECHR. It is not too bold to affirm that it constitutes nowadays 
a peremptory norm of PIL, thus its absence in some of international criminal courts’ 
statute (e.g. ICTR, Special Court for Sierra Leone, etc.) does not at all imply that it is not 
applicable, far from that.  
(55) ICTY, the Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 1995, § 135; ECHR, Streletz and Kessler v. Ad, 
22/03/2001, §§ 87-88; ICTY, the Prosecutor v. Vasilievic, 2002, §§ 193, 196, 200-202.  
13
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II.1.3. Crime of aggression (or formerly known as “Crime 
against peace) 
 
From the commencement, one has to underline that this crime (formerly 
known as “Crime against Peace”) differs at least from the other three 
international crimes to the extent that it is the only one that requires an 
official capacity (as an organ of a State) for an individual to be pinned down 
as a criminal. In sum, this crime entails, at the same time, the responsibility 
of the State whose organ has planned or decided a war of aggression. 
The criminalization of this conduct logically depended from the outlawing 
of war, i.e. offensive use of force; hence, as long as war was not banned 
from the realm of PIL, it was not conceivable to construe such an 
international crime. In fact, Article 227 of Versailles Treaty did not provide 
for the trial of William II for having, strictly speaking, waged a war of 
aggression, but for having disrespected conventional obligations 
guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg. One has to wait 
1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact for war of aggression to be outlawed.(57) Though, 
this international agreement does not necessarily convey the necessary 
criminalization since it restricts itself to ban war, thus creating rights and 
obligations incumbent upon States parties to it and not their organs for 
having waged it. IMT Statute and jurisprudence will be instrumental in 
bridging the gap between the “mere” unlawfulness of war and the necessary 
criminalization of State organs for having decided and planned it.(58) Indeed, 
referring precisely to the 1928 Pact of Paris, the Tribunal stated, in order to 
satisfy the requirement set by the principle of legality, that: 
“In its opinion, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of 
national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is 
                                                                                                    
(56) Supreme Court of Canada, Finta case, 1994 
(57) More on this treaty, G. Distefano, “La longue marche vers l’abrogation du droit 
d’auto-protection armée : happy end ou remake en vue ? », in Unité et diversité du 
droit international. Ecrits en l’honneur du Professeur Pierre-Marie Dupuy, sous la 
direction de D. Alland et al., Paris, 2014, pp. 299-320 ; 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dYL0mqMoqI&t=2609s. 
(58) The indictment as regards the crime against peace concerned the invasion of 
Austria (1938), Czechoslovakia and Poland (1939), Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Denmark and Norway (1940), Yugoslavia, Greece and USSR (1941),  
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illegal in International Law; and that those who plan and wage such a 
war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a 
crime in so doing”(59) 
The completion of the crime against peace goes through the adoption by 
the UNGA in 1974 of the definition of aggression (resolution 3314)(60), 
branded herein as the “most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use 
of force”. Indeed, this UNGA normative resolution(61) marks the end of a 
series of attempt to define aggression carried out since the LoN. However, 
this resolution does not per se convey the criminalization of the aggression 
as far as the international criminal responsibility of the individual (organ of a 
State) is concerned.(62) One has to wait the 1996 ILC Draft Code whose 
Article 16 states: 
“An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or 
orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression 
committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of 
aggression”(63) 
Finally, the connection with resolution 3314 is made through Article 8bis 
of the Rome Statute(64) which, while referring implicitly to the UNGA 
                                      
(59) IMT, Judgement of 1st October 1946, p. 445. 
(60) Admittedly considered nowadays as genuinely reflecting CIL in this regard, see: G. 
Distefano, “Use of force”, 2014, supra note 8. 
(61) On the meaning of this concept, see: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 383-391. 
(62) On the contrary, Article 5 (2) provides that a “war of aggression is a crime against 
international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility”. The latter 
refers to State international responsibility whilst the “crime” alludes to a specific form 
of internationally wrongful act committed by a State of a particular gravity. Quite 
ironically, though, the “crime of State”, as it was at that time known and as such 
codified by the ILC in its provisional draft code on State responsibility, was eventually, 
and regrettably, expunged from the final text adopted in 2001. 
(63) YILC, 1996, Vol. II (Part II), para. 50.  
(64) “1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of 
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations.  
1. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
15
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resolution, enumerates the relevant elements of this international crime in a 
more detailed way than the 1996 ILC Draft Code.(65) 
                                                                                                    
Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration 
of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:  
1. (a)  The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of 
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from 
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of 
another State or part thereof;  
2. (b)  Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of 
another State;  
3. (c)  The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of 
another State;  
4. (d)  An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or 
marine and air fleets of another State;  
5. (e)  The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of 
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in 
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;  
6. (f)  The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act 
of aggression against a third State;  
7. (g)  The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of 
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement 
therein”. 
(65) Article 8bis was inserted into ICC Statute by resolution RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010 
adopted by the Assembly of States parties to the Rome Statute. In fact, in 1998, at the 
time of the adoption of the latter, there was no consensus with regard to the crime of 
aggression and thus the question was remanded for further consideration. The real 
bone of contention, though, did not lay in the definition of this crime, in other words 
the substantive law, but strong tensions existed with regard to its institutional aspects. 
In other words, how to reconcile the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime and the UNSC 
powers with regard to the determination of aggression within the system of collective 
security. UNSC’s permanent members fretted above all that to bestow upon the ICC 
jurisdiction on this crime would prejudice or even fetter UNSC’s competence in this 
regard. That’s why the most salient ICC provisions related to the crime of aggression 
are not aforementioned Article 8, but rather (long) Articles 15bis and 15ter which are 
respectively (and aptly) named: “Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
(State referral, proprio motu)” and “Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of 
16
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II.1.4. War Crimes 
This category of international crimes probably encompasses the oldest 
criminalization of individuals’ conducts.(66) Admittedly, this formula refers to 
the so-called “grave breaches of IHL”, notably of 1949 GE Conventions (plus 
the additional protocols) as well as of The Hague Conventions. As the very 
formula clearly indicates, for a war crime to occur, the existence of an 
armed conflict must be proved, either international armed conflict (IAC) or 
(as it will be shown) a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) and the 
existence of a nexus between the material act perpetrated by the accused 
and the conflict must also be established.(67) 
According to the World Court, and the dictum can hardly be challenged, 
contemporary IHL is made up of two branches of the “Laws of war” which 
have sprouted and developed alongside yet independently: 
“A large number of customary rules have been developed by the 
practice of States and are an integral part of the international law 
relevant to the question posed. The "laws and customs of war" - as 
they were traditionally called – were the subject of efforts at 
codification undertaken in The Hague (including the Conventions of 
                                                                                                    
aggression (Security Council referral)”. It is apparent that the last provision embodies 
the sensitive balance of interests between international criminal justice (ICC) and 
system of collective security (UNSC). This is all the more relevant since, as it will be 
shown, ICC is not an organ of the UN while entertaining strong links with its system. 
Other ICC’s provisions reflect the (could be sometimes tense) relations between UNSC 
and ICC; for instance, Article 15ter (referral of a situation by the UNSC to the ICC) and 
Article 16 (by virtue of which a “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or 
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, 
in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has 
requested the Court to that effect”. UNSC has indeed, alas, not disdained to make 
recourse to this provision, e.g.: “UNSC Requests, consistent with the provisions of 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former 
officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over 
acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, 
shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with 
investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides 
otherwise;” (para. 1).  
(66) IMT, Judgement of 1st October 1946, p. pp. 449-463. 
(67) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., paras. 55-59; ICC, The Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, 29 January 2007, paras. 286-293. 
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1899 and 1907), and were based partly upon the St. Petersburg 
Declaration of 1868 as well as the results of the Brussels Conference 
of 1874. This "Hague Law" and, more particularly, the Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, fixed the rights 
and duties of belligerents in their conduct of operations and limited 
the choice of methods and means of injuring the enemy in an 
international armed conflict. One should add to this the "Geneva 
Law" (the Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949), which protects 
the victims of war and aims to provide safeguards for disabled armed 
forces personnel and persons not taking part in the hostilities. These 
two branches of the law applicable in armed conflict have become so 
closely interrelated that they are considered to have gradually 
formed one single complex system, known today as international 
humanitarian law. The provisions of the Additional Protocols of 1977 
give expression and attest to the unity and complexity of that law”(68) 
As it was the case for the previous category of international crimes, the 
primeval sources of war crimes may be traced back to the IMT Statute,(69) 
whose Article 6 (b) introduces the first (yet non exhaustive) enumeration of 
conducts – during an international conflict(70) – the commission of which 
engages criminal responsibility. Without entering into details, it noteworthy 
to underline that the majority of these conducts amount to a violation of 
The Hague Conventions; in other words, they are governed by the rules 
regulating the conduct of hostilities.(71) 
                                      
(68) ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, para. 75 (p. 256). 
(69) The existence of these crimes is practically unchallenged, bar very isolated, and 
highly contestable doctrinal stands, such as: “We are not persuaded, even when 
viewing them in 2010 through the prism of the many subsequent positive 
developments, that those instruments notably The Hague Conventions could, in 
1944, have formed a sufficiently sound and acknowledged legal basis for war crimes to 
be regarded as having been precisely defined at that time, and for their definition to 
have been foreseeable”, ECHR, Kononov v. Latvia, Judgement of 17 May 2010, para. 10 
(separate opinion of Judge Costa joined by Judges Kalaydjieva AND Poalelungi).  
(70) For the time being and until a recent past, war crimes could only be perpetrated 
during an international armed conflict, i.e. grossly speaking between States.  
(71) E.g.: “namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for 
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
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The other branch of IHL, i.e. “Geneva Law”, makes its appearance, as far 
as international criminal law is concerned, through the four 1949 GE. 
Indeed, it’s thanks to these universal international agreements that the very 
formula “grave breaches” is introduced in an international convention 
related to IHL. Each of these four conventions deals with a specific subject-
matter, respectively: I (wounded and sick in armed forces in the field),(72) II 
(wounded, sick shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea),(73) III 
(treatment of prisoners of war)(74) and IV (protection of civilian persons in 
time of war).(75) Consequently, each of them devotes at least one specific 
provision to the identification of “grave breaches” whose perpetration 
“against persons and property protected by the present convention”(76) 
leads to the entailment of international criminal responsibility (“penal 
sanctions” in the jargon of the 1949 GE). In the same vein, Articles 11 (4)(77) 
                                                                                                    
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity;”. 
(72) Article 50: “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and 
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”. 
(73) Article 51, the content of which is identical to Article 50/I (supra note 72). 
(74) Article 130: “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully 
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this 
Convention” 
(75) Article 147: “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, 
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully 
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the 
present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”. 
(76) This formula is common to the four 1949 GE.  
(77) “Any wilful act or omission which seriously endangers the physical or mental 
health or integrity of any person who is in the power of a Party other than the one on 
which he depends and which either violates any of the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 
and 2 or fails to comply with the requirements of paragraph 3 shall be a grave breach 
of this Protocol” 
19
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and 85(78) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 GE (thus applicable 
international armed conflict) follow the same path, accruing to the conducts 
likely to trigger penal sanctions.  
International Criminal Tribunals are roughly in tune with the 1949 GE and 
The Hague Conventions; ICC Statute adopts a two-tier structure since war 
crimes are made up not only of the aforementioned “grave breaches” of the 
four 1949 GE but also of: “other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework 
of international law, namely …”.(79)In sum, “grave breaches” constitute a 
narrower group within that of war crimes which hence encompasses “other 
violations …”, too. 
Besides, this provision embodies another two-layer approach having 
regard to the international (or not) character of the armed conflict. Some 
words must then be spent with regard to one of the major topics of IHL, 
namely the qualification of an armed conflict in the context of war crime. 
Grossly speaking, and for the purposes of the present volume, an IAC 
comprises nowadays not only an armed conflict between two or more 
States(80) but also “wars of national liberation”, i.e. conflicts where: 
“peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of 
self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations”(81) 
On the other hand, NIAC find themselves below that threshold since they 
are, according to Article 8 (2) f) of the ICC Statute, armed conflicts: 
                                      
(78) “This provision, in addition to reiterate and complete the grave breaches 
envisaged by the four 1949, GE adds a further list of violations « when committed 
wilfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or 
serious injury to body or health” (Art. 85 (3)).  
(79) A detailed list follows en suite.  
(80) According by the way to Common Article 2 of the 1949 GE.  
(81) Article 1 (4) 1977 P/I. On the concept of right of peoples to self-determination, see 
G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 185-202. 
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“that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted 
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups”(82) 
Below this threshold lays a final category of situations – within the 
territory of a State(83) – characterized by “internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar 
nature”, as called for this same provision in its first sentence. Again, this 
definition of the lowest threshold of application of IHL represents the 
ultimate definition of “what is not” a NIAC under PIL.  
We have hitherto briefly expounded the major features of war crimes 
while referring to their perpetration in the context of an IAC. Instinctively, 
the reader has intuitively grasped that they may also occur during a NIAC. 
True, yet this is certainly a recent novelty in international criminal law, in 
fact a bold (and very welcome) jurisprudential conquest. Indeed, one has to 
applaud the wise farsightedness of the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber judgement 
in the Tadic case, whose contribution to PIL at large, as it will appear in 
other sections of this volume, is highly precious. In the 1995 Judgement the 
Appeals Chamber faced with the thorny question of whether war crimes 
may be perpetrated in a NIAC developed a series of argumentation that 
ultimately led to their existence. The relevant paragraph – of this founding 
                                      
(82) This definition, which may considered as reflecting CIL in this regard, does in fact 
transcend, and in some respects modify, previous categorizations purported by the GE 
1949 (common Article 3) as well as by 1977 P/II, whose article 1 (1) is in effect more 
stringent since it restricts the application of the P/II to “armed conflicts which take 
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol”. No 
such conditions were set forward by Common Article of the 1949 GE  which merely 
requires that the conflict takes place on the territory of one of the HCP. Hence, in the 
light of the foregoing it can be argued that Article 8 (2) f) ICC Statute codifies a CIL 
definition of NIAC which has in fact modified both Common Article 3 1949 GE and 
Article 1 (1) P/II. Otherwise, this situation may also be seen through the lens of the law 
of treaties and more specifically the succession of treaties in time. See: G. Distefano, 
2019, pp. 446-449. 
(83) Or of several States, as it happens with regard to the so-called “Daesh” or “IS” 
having taken up the arms against Iraqi and Syrian governments in their respective 
territories.  
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decision of international criminal law – undoubtedly deserves to be quoted 
in its entirety: 
“Since the 1930s, however, the aforementioned distinction has 
gradually become more and more blurred, and international legal 
rules have increasingly emerged or have been agreed upon to 
regulate internal armed conflict. There exist various reasons for this 
development. First, civil wars have become more frequent, not only 
because technological progress has made it easier for groups of 
individuals to have access to weaponry but also on account of 
increasing tension, whether ideological, inter-ethnic or economic; as 
a consequence the international community can no longer turn a 
blind eye to the legal regime of such wars. Secondly, internal armed 
conflicts have become more and more cruel and protracted, involving 
the whole population of the State where they occur: the all-out 
resort to armed violence has taken on such a magnitude that the 
difference with international wars has increasingly dwindled (suffice 
to think of the Spanish civil war, in 1936-39, of the civil war in the 
Congo, in 1960-1968, the Biafran conflict in Nigeria, 1967-70, the civil 
strife in Nicaragua, in 1981-1990 or El Salvador, 1980-1993). Thirdly, 
the large-scale nature of civil strife, coupled with the increasing 
interdependence of States in the world community, has made it more 
and more difficult for third States to remain aloof: the economic, 
political and ideological interests of third States have brought about 
direct or indirect involvement of third States in this category of 
conflict, thereby requiring that international law take greater account 
of their legal regime in order to prevent, as much as possible, adverse 
spill-over effects. Fourthly, the impetuous development and 
propagation in the international community of human rights 
doctrines, particularly after the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948, has brought about significant changes in 
international law, notably in the approach to problems besetting the 
world community. A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been 
gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually 
the maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est 
(all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm 
foothold in the international community as well. It follows that in the 
area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate wars and 
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civil wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned. 
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture 
or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private 
property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering 
when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from 
enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when 
armed violence has erupted "only" within the territory of a sovereign 
State? If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the 
legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of 
human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy 
should gradually lose its weight”(84) 
Thanks to this revolutionary finding by the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber it is 
nowadays unchallenged that war crimes may be perpetrated in the context 
of a NIAC,(85) as ICC Statute adamantly states in its Article 8 (2) c) and e).(86)  
 
II.1.5. Crime against Humanity (CAH) 
 
Introduced for the first time(87) in 1945 by the IMT through its Article 6 
(c), the definition of this category of international crimes is, unlike crime of 
                                      
(84) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 1995, para. 97. Among other elements, the 
Appeals Chamber makes a decisive reference to the so-called Martens clause 
(embodying the famous “elementary considerations of humanity”). In this regard, see: 
G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 620-632. 
(85) Quite correctly, ICTY made clear, instead, that “grave breaches” of the GE 1949 
may, of course, occur only in the context of a NIAC (ibid, para. 80).  
(86) Furthermore, ICTR Statute provided in its Article 4 the legal basis for this 
criminalization (“Violations to Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II”). In this regard, one may refer the reader back to the ICTR’s 
Judgement in the Akayesu case (1998), in many respects as important as Tadic case (in 
1995) has been to the ICTY, notably paras. 617-637. 
(87) However, a timid prodrome may be traced back to the Allied (France, Great Britain 
and Russia) Declaration issued in 1915 with regard to the massacres perpetrated 
against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: “For about a month the Kurd and Turkish 
population of Armenia has been massacring Armenians with the connivance and often 
assistance of Ottoman authorities … In view of these new crimes of Turkey against 
humanity and civilization the Allied governments announce publicly to the Sublime 
Porte that they will hold personally responsible these crimes all members of the 
Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres” 
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genocide that flows from it, not uniform as one may in fact expect. 
Moreover, there exist manifold definitions of crime against humanity within 
municipal law of States, that happen sometimes, in addition, more accurate 
than in PIL.  
Perhaps the diversity of these definitions – especially in their penumbra – 
is due to the fact that this category of international crimes represents, in a 
higher degree compared to the two previous groups of crimes, a genuine 
shrinking of States’ domestic jurisdiction (leaving aside the situation of the 
rights of minorities). It is not too bold to assert then that HR are begotten 
through the crime against humanity, and hence the normative “bing 
bang”(88) of crime against humanity is undoubtedly Article 6 (c) of the IMT 
Statute which reads as follows: 
“namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of 
the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”(89) 
                                                                                                    
(May 29, 1915, italics added). See in this respect the fascinating book of Ph. Sands, East 
West Street. On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, London, 2016 
(88) In fact, Article 230 (penalties) of the 1920 Sèvres Treaty, which was meant to seal 
the peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey but was never ratified by the latter, 
provided that “the Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers 
the persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for 
the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory 
which formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914” (emphasis added). Quite 
intuitively, the massacres referred to are those concerning notably the Armenian 
population of former Ottoman Empire. Paragraph 4 of this same provision envisaged 
the possibility that the LoN created a “tribunal competent to deal with the said 
massacres”, in such an instance Turkey would have been bound by the duty to defer to 
it those accused of such crimes to it. Failing the entry into force of the Treaty of Sevres 
(which was later on replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 which embodied no 
clauses of this nature), there has been neither domestic punishment nor international 
repression for the aforementioned massacres.  
(89) Italics added. See also the consonant definition of this crime in the US Control 
Council Law n° 10 (December 1945) applicable to the US-occupied Germany allowing 
the occupying power to prosecute German individuals on the account of this crime.  
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The definition of this new category of international crimes implied and 
required the existence of an IAC, i.e. the so-called nexus with a (unlawful) 
war (that is to say a war of aggression). Furthermore, one ought to highlight 
the explicit specification to the irrelevance of municipal law for the purposes 
of qualifying such acts as being an international crime. This also proves the 
newness of these crimes.  
Yet, some authors as well States were not satisfied with the requirement 
of a nexus, especially since the crime of genocide – indeed a offspring of 
crime against humanity – which was on the verge of being defined (in 1948) 
got rid of it infra II.1.6. And indeed this happened thanks to Article 3 of 
ICTR Statute(90) which in a certain way replaced the nexus requiring an 
“armed conflict” with “widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”.(91) Next 
conventional definitions(92) will confirm this substitution certainly due to the 
parallel evolution of HR. During the diplomatic conference in Rome(93) a lot of 
discussion took place around the formula “widespread or systematic”, for 
example in comparison with ICTR Statute’s which has “and” instead of “or”. On 
the grounds of a literal interpretation one may tentatively infer from the latter 
that ICC’s formula is larger than ICTR’s. Yet, some ambiguities remain since 
Article 7 (2) a) ICC seems to encompass both the systematic(94) and the 
widespread characters;(95) in this connection, the policy (or plan), aiming at the 
                                      
(90) True, the nexus was reaffirmed in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute which in effect 
required the CAH to be perpetrated during an “armed conflict, whether international 
or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population”. In this 
connection, it ought to be added that the substantive definition contained in the 
aforementioned provision has been considered fleshed up compared to that enshrined 
in IMT Statute.  
(91) Italics added. 
(92) Article 2 of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute, Article 7 ICC Statute, Article 
9 of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (which makes an explicit 
renvoi to Article 7 ICC).  
(93) It must be nonetheless underlined that quite a few delegations argued to maintain 
this nexus during the conference.  
(94) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 2002, para. 98.  
(95) This section of Article 7 reads as follows: “ ‘Attack directed against any civilian 
population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple thus widespread 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant 
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perpetration of one of the CAH while not being one of its constitutive 
elements, undoubtedly represents a compelling evidence that the attack 
directed against the civilian population was widespread and systematic.(96) It is 
hence wise to await a further jurisprudential clarification.  
In any case, and at this stage, the following elements may be distilled from 
the definition of CCA embodied in Article 7 ICC Statute. Firstly, the attack must 
be directed, contrariwise to war crimes, to the civilian population. Secondly, 
the attack in question does not have to be perforce a military attack, that is to 
say an attack triggered by military forces. Thirdly, the attack must occur 
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack”, hence a CAH may also be perpetrated by NSA.(97) Fourthly, the 
actor of a CAH must act “with knowledge of this attack”. This seems to 
encompass a sort of special intent which nevertheless is less hard to prove 
than the dolus specialis requires for the genocide. Therefore, lack of this 
knowledge will prevent the existence of a CAH, leaving only possible war 
crimes or simple “killing”.(98)Fifthly, as far as the “criminal intent” or motive 
(dolus) is concerned, no such element is required,(99) bar in one of the eleven 
acts listed in the definition of CAH, i.e. persecution.(100) However, motive 
remains useful in view of determining the penalty that hence will be higher 
without it (it is indeed considered as an “aggravating circumstance”).  
Regarding the list of acts likely to constitute a CAH, it appears clearly that 
it is much longer than that of Article 6 (c) IMT, and again this is due to the 
tremendous evolution of HR since 1945, especially to their substance. For 
instance, apartheid, torture and “enforced disappearance of persons” may 
surely be ranked among the most recent acquisitions. Another great novelty 
                                                                                                    
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy systematic to commit such 
attack”. 
(96) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Krstic, 2004, para. 225, whereby the Appeals Chamber 
reversed Trial Chamber’s judgement (2001, para. 685). In the same vein : ICTY, The 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 2002, para. 98.  
(97) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 1999, paras. 100-101. 
(98) However, as attested by Article 7 (paragraph 2 of the Introduction) of the 
“Elements of Crimes”, this condition must be loosely construed to the extent that it 
does not require “proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of 
the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization”. 
(99) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1999, para. 275.  
(100) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., para. 636. 
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is represented by the new generation of CAH constituted by the so-called 
“gender crimes”, comprising “forced pregnancy”; this acquisition, though, 
was not carried without some difficulty, since some States which banned 
abortion (Holy See, Ireland, etc.) did not clearly intend the latter to be 
criminalized, that’s why an interpretation of this new crime took account of 
this need.(101) On the other hand, other acts which were within the compass 
of Article 6 (c) have been subsequently developed and extended.(102) On the 
contrary, other alleged CAH, strenuously defended by some delegations in 
Rome, have not been included: economic embargo, terrorism as well as 
mass starvation.  
In some other cases, yet, Article 7 ICC has ended up – at least pending 
further jurisprudential refining – restricting the scope of CAH. For instance, 
with regard to persecutions, section 1 (h) of this provision defines this crime as 
“Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”. If, on one hand, the 
substantive list is noticeably larger than previous definitions, on the other, 
the last fragment (in added italics) seems to include a nexus which was not 
hitherto required. At first glance, indeed, this condition may lead to a 
restriction of the scope of this CAH. One may wonder why this has 
happened; a tentative and intuitive answer could be that States at large – 
and some more specifically – are at pains in apprehending this CAH(103) and 
                                      
(101) Article 7 (2) f) of ICC Statute indeed provides that by “forced pregnancy” is 
meant “the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent 
of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave 
violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as 
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy”. The last phrase (in added italics) 
specifically addresses this sensitive question by excluding from the definition of this 
CAH legislations and acts adopted thereof which relate to the national policy in matter 
of pregnancy. 
(102) In this regard, one may mention deportation which has been supplemented by 
“forcible transfer of population” which refers to ethnic cleansing within the borders of 
a single (or same) State.  
(103) Article 7 (1) h) of the Elements of Crimes provides that “the perpetrator severely 
deprived, contrary to international law, one or more persons of fundamental rights”. 
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hence they feel the need, to all intents and purposes, to limit its material 
field of application.  
Finally, this definition is open-ended one to the extent that Article 7 (1) k) 
sets forth “Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health” 
may be qualified as CAH.(104) Thanks to this last section of Article 7 ICC – 
aptly termed as umbrella clause – ICTR was able to consider – because of an 
identical provision – the fact of enforcing Tutsi women to be exposed naked 
before notably (Hutus) men as a CAH.(105) 
 
II.1.6. Crime of genocide 
 
II.1.6.1. Birth of the Concept and its Definition 
 
In some respects, this species of international crime is the most famous in 
the eyes of the layman who even may tend to subsume – erroneously of 
course – all the others under it. Historically speaking, genocide is certainly a 
sub-category of CAH even though it originally found its place within Article 6 
(c) IMT.(106) The very term of genocide is made up from the Greek word 
“γένος”, i.e. race, and a Latin verb, “caedo” (infinite “cædere”), i.e. “I kill”. In 
1944, Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer of Jewish origin, published a book 
entitled: “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation - Analysis of 
                                      
(104) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, 2002, paras. 234-240.  
(105) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, paras. 429, 447. 
(106) Indeed, while not being mentioned in the very terms of this provision, the 
Prosecutor got availed of in his Indictment (Count Three): US et al. v. Goering et al., 
The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the IMT (1945-1946), pp. 43-44. 
Furthermore, US Military tribunal prosecuted and condemned upon this indictment: 
US v. Alstoetter, III Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law n° 10 (1951), p. 954. Even though it was originally 
subsumed on Count 3, i.e. War Crimes (Indictment, adopted 8 October 1945, Trial of 
the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1947, 
43.  
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Government - Proposals for Redress”,(107) in which he sketched a definition of 
genocide, while coining, obviously, for the first time the very term: 
“Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the 
actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their 
individual capacity, but as members of the national group” (108) 
As it will be delved into later on, the intimate relation between an 
individual and a specific group are material in order to grasp the very 
essence of this crime; the belonging of the former to the latter makes him 
(her) a target of the unlawful action. Therefore, it is due to this link that the 
individual is targeted so that the ultimate victim of action is the group 
through the individual appertaining to it. The definition is larger and 
narrower than that purported by the UN 1948 Genocide Convention(109) at 
the same time, since it covers cultural genocide while at the same time 
taking solely into account the national group.  
Thanks also the IMT jurisprudence, the definition and autonomous 
character of the crime of genocide underwent a rapid ripening since in 1946, 
UNGA resolution 96 (I) not only enshrines for the first time the 
criminalization of genocide but also affirmed that it represents: 
“a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as 
homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings” 
Hence, the nexus between individual (and crime directed against) and the 
group to which he (or she) belongs (and the crime directed against) are 
intimately intertwined on the grounds of specific intention (dolus specialis) 
according to which the ultimate goal of the crime is to “destroy entirely or in 
part” it.(110) 
                                      
(107) The uprising of the ghetto of Warsaw and its bloody repression are not without 
influence on the awareness by the author of the terrible policy waged by Nazis in 
Europe and surely constitutes a point of non-return in the awakening of the legal 
conscience of mankind (UNGA resolution 96 (I)). See also: ICJ, Application of Genocide 
Convention, 2007, para. 193 (p. 125). See in this regard: Ph. Sands, East West Street. 
On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, London, 2016. 
(108) Washington, 1944, at 79.  
(109) A masterly commentary of this law-making convention: The UN Genocide 
Convention. A Commentary, ed. by P. Gaeta, Oxford, 2009.  
(110) UNGA Resolution 96 (I), 11 December 1946. It is noteworthy to observe that this 
resolution did not encompass, contrary to Lemkin’s definition, cultural genocide. 
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Lastly, “in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge”(111), 
UNGA adopted unanimously on 9 December 1948 the Genocide 
Convention.(112) A brief perusal of the main substantive provisions of this 
Convention is not without interest especially because the definition 
enshrined therein will not noticeably evolve through the successive 
international treaties up to and included ICC Statute, contrariwise to the 
other international crimes, as we have seen.  
In accordance with Article 1, genocide – which is established as “a crime 
under international law” – may be perpetrated either in time of peace and 
war and hence high contracting parties commit themselves to prevent and 
punish it. It ought to be observed in this respect that UN Genocide 
Convention sets thus forward an obligation for States to prevent and punish 
genocide while at the same time making it a crime if committed by an 
individual hence engaging the latter’s international responsibility. In 2007 
ICJ, unsurprisingly held that a State party to it may also entail its 
responsibility for committing genocide and not only for not preventing 
and/or punishing it. Indeed, even though “such an obligation not to 
perpetrate a genocide is not expressly imposed by the actual terms of the 
Convention”, this obligation flows from a combined construction of two 
provisions of the Convention, namely I and III, alongside with the Preamble 
(i.e. contextual interpretation). The Court affirms indeed that in its view: 
“taking into account the established purpose of the Convention, the 
effect of Article I is to prohibit States from themselves committing 
genocide. Such a prohibition follows, first, from the fact that the 
Article categorizes genocide as a ‘crime under international law’: by 
agreeing to such a categorization, the State parties must logically be 
undertaking not to commit the act so described. Secondly, it follows 
from the expressly stated obligation to prevent the commission of 
acts of genocide. That obligation requires the States parties, inter 
alia, to employ the means at their disposal … to prevent persons or 
groups not directly under their authority from committing an act of 
genocide or any of the other acts mentioned in Article III. It would be 
paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so far 
                                      
(111) Preamble of the UN 1948 Genocide Convention, which entered into force in 
1951.  
(112) UNGA Resolution 216 (III) A.  
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as within their power, commission of genocide by persons over which 
they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit such 
acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such 
firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned 
under international law. In short, the obligation to prevent genocide 
necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide”(113)  
Article II enshrines the definition of genocide which requires both the 
commission of an act (“actus reus”) and the specific intention (“dolus 
specialis”) aiming at destroying entirely or partially a national, racial or 
religious group. Therefore, as already underscored, the individual which is 
affected by the criminal act is transcended by its appurtenance to the group 
in point which is then ultimately the true target of the genocide. The 
following acts convey – and substantiate – the specific intention to destroy 
the group concerned: a) “killing members of the group”, in effect at least 
two; b) “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”; c) 
“deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part”; d) “imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group”; e) “forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group”. By way of consequence, the UN 
Genocide Convention criminalizes the following acts mentioned in Article III: 
a) the commission of genocide; b) “conspiracy to commit genocide”, which 
will not be encompassed by ICC later on; c) “direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide”; d) “attempt to commit genocide”; e) “complicity in 
genocide”. As provided in Article IV, any individual may commit genocide: 
“constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”.  
Articles VI to IX make up the institutional part of the Convention, i.e. they 
relate to the means of its implementation through the setting up of the 
different forms of jurisdiction and responsibilities (individual and States 
parties). They will examined later on (infra III.2).  
As already highlighted, the last of the international crimes, in order of 
appearance in PIL, undoubtedly features the most resilient definition insofar 
as it has barely evolved since 1948. Without entering into a tedious 
enumeration, ICTY (article 4) as well as ICTR (2) Statutes repeat pari passu 
                                      
(113) ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para. 166 (p. 113; italics added).  
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the definition of genocide embodied in Article II of the UN Genocide.(114) The 
same can be said as regards ICC Statute (Article 6) save the deletion of 
“conspiracy” as one of the elements of this crime enumerated in Article 
III,(115) the definition being thus the same as that enshrined in Article II of the 
UN Genocide.  
Against the backdrop of this (unvaried) definition of genocide, it is not 
without interest to say a few words on the assets and shortcomings of the 
1948 UN Genocide Convention.  Among its assets, one has to mention, 
beside the definition of this crime, the criminalization of the “conspiracy” 
aiming at committing a genocide and the reaffirmation of a parallel 
international responsibility of individual and State which failed to prevent 
and/or to punish the author(s) of a genocide, but also for having 
perpetrated the very crime of genocide through its own organs.(116) On the 
negative side, one may regret the failure to include cultural genocide.(117) 
                                      
(114) Likewise: Article 1 of the 1968 “Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity”, UNGA resolution 2391 
(XXIII); Article 1 (para. 1) of the 1974 Council of Europe “Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes”; ILC 
1996 Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, UN doc. A/51/10, 
paras. 46-48, whose Article 17 borrows word-for-word the definition in Article 2 of the 
1948 UN Genocide Convention.   
(115) Indeed, “conspiracy” is not listed in Article 6 of the “Elements of Crimes” of the 
ICC.  
(116) Supra note 113. 
(117) In its wake, ICJ has rejected the allegation of a crime of cultural genocide: “The 
rejection of proposals to include within the Convention political groups and cultural 
genocide also demonstrates that the drafters were giving close attention to the 
positive identification of groups with specific distinguishing well-established, some said 
immutable, characteristics. A negatively defined group cannot be seen in that way”, 
Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para. 194 (p. 125). Likewise, para. 334 (p. 
186). The Court reiterated its stance in the Application of Genocide Convention 
(Croatia v. Serbia), 2008, para. 141 (p. 465). However, ICTY argued that even though 
cultural genocide is not within the compass of the definition of genocide as an 
international crime, the mere fact of destroying all the cultural (land-)marks of a group 
(otherwise defined) may well prove the special intent to destroy it: The Prosecutor v. 
Krstic, 2001, para. 580: “The Trial Chamber is aware that it must interpret the 
Convention with due regard for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. It therefore 
recognises that, despite recent developments, customary international law limits the 
definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of all 
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Furthermore, the Convention adopts a narrow definition of the belonging to 
one of the groups encompassed by Article II, insofar as it is based on the 
involuntary appurtenance of the individuals, i.e. since their birth, thus 
excluding the voluntary belonging of individual to a group whatsoever, for 
instance genocide on “political grounds”.(118) Moreover, one may also 
deplore that the four groups within the compass of genocide (national, 
ethnic, racial and religious) are not accurately defined. On another key, that 
of implementation, the means provided to this effect by the 1948 UN 
Genocide Convention are far from being optimal.  
ICJ has stated already back in 1951 that the crime of genocide appertains 
to customary international law in a famous dictum which deserved to be 
quoted extensively: 
“The principles underlying the Convention are principles which are 
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any 
conventional obligation … The Convention was manifestly adopted 
for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult 
to imagine a convention that might have this dual character to a 
greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the 
very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm 
and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In such a 
convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their 
own; they merely have, one and au, a common interest, namely, the 
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être 
of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one 
cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or 
                                                                                                    
or part of the group. Hence, an enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological 
characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these elements which give to 
that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall 
under the definition of genocide. The Trial Chamber however points out that where 
there is physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous attacks on the 
cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks 
which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the 
group. In this case, the Trial Chamber will thus take into account as evidence of intent 
to destroy the group the deliberate destruction of mosques and houses belonging to 
members of the group”. Likewise: ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para. 
344 (p. 186).  
(118) Supra note 117.  
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of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights 
and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by 
virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and measure 
of all its provisions”(119) 
Other international jurisdictions have by all means followed in the ICJ’s 
footsteps by reaffirming the customary character of the definition contained 
through its illustration by specific examples.(120)  
 
II.1.6.2. “Mens rea” & “Actus reus”, or respectively the 
material act and (special) intent  
 
The distinctive feature of genocide as an international crime is by far the 
requirement of the “mens rea”, in sum the intent underlying the criminal act 
itself. This Latin formula, which deeply pervades criminal law, can be literally 
translated into: “guilty mind”, conveying thus one of the elements of 
criminal responsibility, i.e. the intent to harm by performing a (criminal) act, 
that is to say the “actus reus”. Hence, the existence of both elements must 
be then verified for the crime of genocide to occur.  
 
II.1.6.2.1.  “Mens rea” and the crime of genocide: 
the intention to destroy entirely or partially a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group (NERR) 
 
Contrariwise to the other international crimes, genocide requires then a 
specific intention (“dolus specialis”) which is at the origins of the act. The 
simple “dolus” (intention) is not sufficient as a “specific intention” (“dolus 
specialis”) is required, i.e., in accordance with Article II of the UN Genocide 
Convention, an act committed with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. Therefore, the individual 
affected by the criminal act of genocide is not for instance killed for what he 
(or she) is, but on the grounds of his (or her) appurtenance to one of the 
                                      
(119) ICJ, Reservations to Genocide Convention, 1951, p. 23.  
(120) Eichmann case, Israel District Court, 1961, para. 80; ICTR, The Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, 2008, paras. 499-522; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 1999, paras. 66-77, 80-
83, 100-108; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 2001, paras. 44-57, 66-77; ICTY, The 
Prosecutor v. Krstic, 2001, paras. 549-550, 569-572, 580-598; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. 
Krstic, 2004, paras. 12-23. 
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groups listed in the definition.(121) This intent – which seems very much like 
aggravated criminal intention – is required in addition to the criminal intent 
of killing, or causing serious bodily harms, or any other acts enumerated in 
Article II. By way of consequence, “recklessness” or knowing negligence 
(“culpa”) are not sufficient.(122) As the ICTR made clear in the Akayesu case: 
“Special intent is a well-known criminal law concept in the Roman-
continental legal systems. It is required as a constitutive element of 
certain offences and demands that the perpetrator have the clear 
intent to cause the offence charged. According to this meaning, 
special intent is the key element of an intentional offence, which 
offence is characterized by a psychological relationship between the 
physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator”(123)  
This special intent – quintessential of the mens rea as regards the crime 
of genocide – may either be corroborated by the very confession of the 
suspect or be objectively inferred from the relevant factual circumstances. 
With regard to the latter, ICTY deduced the special intent from the analysis 
of the facts brought before it: in the case in point, it reached the conclusion 
that a genocide had been perpetrated in Srebrenica by raising two separate 
yet intertwined questions: a) what is the targeted group?; then, b) is there 
any special intent in targeting this specific group? In the case in point: a) the 
group was exclusively made up by Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica who 
belonged to the group of Bosnian Muslim; b) the intent to eradicate this 
group in a given geographical area may be considered as genocide. Indeed, 
the intention to destroy entirely or partially a group is tantamount to 
endeavour to destroy a part thereof as opposed to other individuals (even 
regardless of their high number) who do not appertain to it. Therefore, it is 
not required to destroy the entire group, the intention to eliminate only a 
part of it in a given geographic area suffices to infer the mens rea and hence 
the crime of genocide. In effect, the fact of systematically killing in this area 
                                      
(121) Hannah Arendt lucidly observed that the banalization of evil has been made 
possible thanks to the depersonalization of the victim (the individual) transcended by 
his appurtenance to the group (Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 
New York, 1963).  
(122) On the contrary, the “wilful blindness” suffices to substantiate the mens rea. For 
instance, a guard in a concentration camp may not pretend that he did not know what 
was going on.  
(123) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 518. 
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the members of a part of this group may entail genocide. Conversely, to kill 
here and there some members of this group might likely not prove the 
specific intent to destroy the entire group. Referring again to Srebrenica, all 
Bosnian Muslims males have been killed, alongside with the expulsion of the 
rest of the population from this area and the destruction of mosques and 
houses belonging to this religious group. By way of consequence, this policy 
resulted in the disappearance of all male Bosnians able to fight to retake 
Srebrenica as well as in the impairment of reproduction within this religious 
group.  
II.1.6.2.2.  “Actus reus”: the material act 
constituting the crime of genocide 
 
The material act that concretises the special intent to destroy in whole or 
in part a group may result in an action or inaction;(124) this feature applies to 
all acts exhaustively listed in the definition of the crime of genocide. The 
most obvious example of genocide by inaction is by way of “deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part” (Article II c) of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention).  
Furthermore, whilst for the acts of “killing” (a), “Causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group” (b) and “Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group” (e), the final outcome must be 
proved, the same is not all required for the acts of “deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 
in whole or in part” (c) and those of “imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group” (d).(125) 
Some words must be briefly spent for each of these acts. Regarding (a), in 
the light of the Akayesu case, 2 material elements are required: i) the death 
of the member of a group; and, b) that the individual has deceased as a 
result of an unlawful act or of an inaction of the accused or of his (or her) 
subordinate. It goes without saying that if an individual is killed in a context 
of genocide, but he (or she) does not belong to the targeted group, then this 
                                      
(124) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., 2001, paras. 15, 40-42. 
(125) The numbering of the acts forming a crime of genocide is drawn from Article II of 
the 1948 UN Genocide Convention; as it has been made clear this list is the same for 
the ICC as well as for the ICTY and ICTR.  
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acts does not amount to an act of genocide.(126)  A thornier question is that 
of the meaning of “killing” especially by taking into account the other 
working language of both the ICC Statute and the 1948 UN Genocide 
Convention. While the French text has retained the word “meurtre” – 
etymologically winking to “murder”, which requires the intention – English 
text has opted for the more neutral “killing” which may also comprise “to 
cause death by negligence or recklessness”. Thus, in accordance with the 
usual rules of interpretation of international treaties as adjusted by the 
general principles of international criminal law (i.e. “favor rei”,(127) that is to 
say the more favourable interpretation for the accused must be referred to), 
the term “killing” has better chances to be referred to instead of “murder”. 
This conception has been indeed embraced by the ICTR in the 
aforementioned Akayesu case,(128) whilst, pending further jurisprudential 
                                      
(126) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 710.  
(127) See infra note 128. 
(128) “500. With regard to Article 2(2)(a) of the Statute, like in the Genocide 
Convention, the Chamber notes that the said paragraph states "meurtre" in the French 
version while the English version states "killing". The Trial Chamber is of the opinion 
that the term "killing" used in the English version is too general, since it could very well 
include both intentional and unintentional homicides, whereas the term "meurtre", 
used in the French version, is more precise. It is accepted that there is murder when 
death has been caused with the intention to do so, as provided for, incidentally, in the 
Penal Code of Rwanda which stipulates in its Article 311 that "Homicide committed 
with intent to cause death shall be treated as murder". 501. Given the presumption 
of innocence of the accused, and pursuant to the general principles of criminal law, the 
Chamber holds that the version more favourable to the accused should be upheld and 
finds that Article 2(2) (a) of the Statute must be interpreted in accordance with the 
definition of murder given in the Penal Code of Rwanda, according to which "meurtre" 
(killing) is homicide committed with the intent to cause death. The Chamber notes in 
this regard that the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, show that the 
proposal by certain delegations that premeditation be made a necessary condition for 
there to be genocide, was rejected, because some delegates deemed it unnecessary 
for premeditation to be made a requirement; in their opinion, by its constitutive 
physical elements, the very crime of genocide, necessarily entails premeditation”. 
Therefore, the killing must be intentional, yet without premeditation. In the same vein: 
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, 2001, paras. 484-485; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. 
Stakic, 2003, para. 515. 
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refinement, ICC’s Elements of Crimes has, on the contrary, enshrined an 
opposite view(129), thus discarding the intentional component of “killing”.   
With regard to (b), that is to say “Causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members of the group”, States have thus accepted the idea that ICC 
punishes acts of physical violence which have not (yet) attained the 
threshold of “killing”. On the contrary, the very concept of “mental harm” is 
far more problematic.(130) The precise scope of this material act of crime 
remains thus particularly tendentious.(131) To cause a serious bodily or 
mental harm does not mean perforce that the harm in point to be 
permanent and irremediable. It seems in fact widely accepted that physical 
harm does not require to be permanent,(132) while it is more debated with 
regard to the mental harm wherein the irremediableness character might be 
required.(133) In any case, it is on the contrary undisputed, that a serious 
bodily and mental harm within the compass of the definition of the crime of 
genocide comprises the following acts: torture, rape, sexual violence, 
inhuman and degrading treatments.  
With regard to (c), that is to say to “deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part”, this “actus reus” must be construed “as … methods of 
destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the 
members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical 
destruction”.(134) Without being exhaustive, Article 2 (2) of the ICTR Statute 
encompasses “ the subjection of a group of people to a subsistence diet, 
systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical 
                                      
(129) Through the lens of “Elements of Crimes” attached to the ICC Statute takes care 
to underscore that “The term ‘killed’ is interchangeable with the term ‘caused death’”, 
Article 6 a) 1, footnote 2. 
(130) China, for instance, insisted for the necessary requirement of the use of 
psychotropic substances, but the proposal was rejected.   
(131) Again, in the eyes of the ICTR, rape and sexual violence may at the same time 
result in a serious bodily and mental harm: ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 
1998, paras. 731-734.  
(132) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 516. 
(133) “Mental harm is understood to mean more than the minor or temporary 
impairment of mental faculties”, ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, 2001, para. 
510. 
(134) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 505.  
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services below minimum requirement”.(135) In the same vein and in the light 
of international jurisprudence, one may also mention: withholding sufficient 
living accommodations, deportation,(136) razing of villages, destruction of 
property, burning of harvest, far-reaching health and environmental 
damages, etc. It clearly appears that in this category of “actus reus”, the 
omission is particularly important; however, this inaction may not be 
equated to mere negligence, but it requires an intentional component (dolus 
specialis). Lastly, contrariwise to the two previous criminal material acts, the 
“actus reus” in question does not require the actual fulfilment of the 
action/omission, but the “group conditions of life must be calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”.(137)  
In respect of (d), that is to say, “imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group”, in the same manner as the previous criminal 
material act, it is not necessary to demonstrate that aim has been fulfilled. 
In the same vein, one ought to underscore that “measures intended to 
prevent births within the group” must not be calculated to destroy the 
group; it suffices that they “prevent the births within the group”. This kind 
of measures are indeed often instrumental to a genocidal plan, as it had 
been the case for the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis during WWII. In 
the light of the aforesaid, the following acts are within the compass of the 
“actus reus” in point: sterilization and or compulsory abortion, castrations; 
segregation of sexes, obstacles to marriage (within the group), etc.(138) That’s 
why it is not inappropriate to speak of these material acts as constituting a  
“biologic genocide”. In this connection, “rape” might also be included as the 
ICTY put forward: “The systematic rape of women … is in some cases 
                                      
(135) Ibid., para. 506. For the purposes of a systemic construction of the material acts 
encompassed by this specific “actus reus”, one might also refer to the relevant 
provisions of 1966 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.  
(136) Not to be mistaken with mere expulsion which is not per se a material act likely 
to trigger the crime of genocide: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 519. 
(137) For instance, Israel Supreme Court (Attorney-General (Israel) v Adolf Eichmann 
36 ILR 5, 1962, para. 80) considered that this “actus reus” applied only to the survivors 
of the Holocaust; on the contrary, for those who had been actually exterminated by 
the Nazis, that was a “killing”, i.e. another material act encompassed by the definition 
of the crime of genocide under (a).  
(138) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 507.  
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intended to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child”.(139) Likewise, 
measures subsumed under heading may also feature a psychological 
dimension (and not only a physical one) as the ICTR made clear with regard 
to rape or sexual violence:  
“The Chamber notes that measures intended to prevent births 
within the group may be physical but can also be mental. For 
instance, rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the 
person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way 
that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not 
to procreate”(140)  
The last category of material acts amounting to a crime of genocide, i.e. 
“Forcibly(141) transferring children of the group to another group” (d), may 
raise a few questions, insofar as 1948 UN Genocide Convention’s drafters 
had rejected cultural genocide. Indeed, this “actus reus” may in some 
respects be misled with the latter. In this case, perhaps as a way to 
reinvigorate this type of genocide, the actual result of the action must be 
proved fort the crime to be perpetrated. In other words, one has to show 
that children are actually transferred from a protected group to another, 
even though ICTR has gone further admitting also the threat to do so.(142) 
Finally an ancillary issue to the application of this provision must be 
addressed, i.e. the UN 1948 Convention does not specify what is meant by 
“children”. Therefore, the question must be sought elsewhere and, through 
systemic interpretation, a potent hint to this effect can be found in the UN 
1989 Convention on the rights of the child, whose Article 1 states that “a 
child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless 
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”. However, 
the threshold appears to be too high since, if the aim is to prevent for a child 
to lose its roots, then at 17 years old it is unlikely that he could be deprived 
of its culture.  
                                      
(139) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, 1996, para. 94. In the same vein: 
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 507. 
(140) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 508. 
(141) This adverb must be construed as including not only physical acts of coercion but 
also threats of intimidation (e.g. aboriginal children in Australia).  
(142) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 506.  
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 Two aspects related to the crime of genocide and its application: 
identification of group and difference and similarities with the CAH 
 
II.1.6.2.3. Identification of protected group under 
the concept of genocide 
 
The concept of group is pivotal in view of grasping the crime of genocide. 
As shown by international jurisprudence, a group must be stable and 
permanently constituted, thus the automatic (as opposed to voluntary) 
appurtenance of an individual (the victim) to it. Hence, the group is 
definitively circumscribed as well as those individuals belonging to it. In the 
Akayesu case, ICTR rebutted the allegation according to which a genocide 
can be perpetrated against a “more ‘mobile’” group, i.e. that people are free 
to adhere to it, for instance a group founded upon political values.(143)  
Furthermore, a group must be defined in a positive way (in sum “who those 
peoples are”) and not negatively (i.e. “who they are not”),(144) since the very 
concept of genocide implies the aim of destructing (entirely of partially) a 
group by targeting an individual on the grounds of its appurtenance to it. 
In this same case, ICTR provides us with useful remarks with regard to the 
four types of “group” against which genocide may be directed (i.e. NERR). A 
“national” group refers to a group made up of human beings “perceived to 
share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of 
rights and duties”.(145) A “ethnic” group, instead, comprises all individuals 
sharing “a common language and culture”;(146) whilst a “racial” group 
                                      
(143) “On reading through the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, it 
appears that the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only ‘stable’ 
groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and membership of which is determined 
by birth, with the exclusion of the more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins through 
individual voluntary commitment, such as political and economic groups. Therefore, a 
common criterion in the four types of groups protected by the Genocide Convention is 
that membership in such groups would seem to be normally not challengeable by its 
members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often 
irremediable manner”, ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 511.  
(144) ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para. 193 (p. 125) ; also para. 196 
(pp. 125-126). Likewise, ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 512. 
(145) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 512. The Tribunal rightly 
makes reference to the ICJ’s decision in the Nottebohm case ICJ, 1955, p. 23). 
(146) Ibid., para. 513.  
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focuses on the “hereditary physical traits often identified with a 
geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious 
factors.”(147) Lastly, a “religious” group is made of peoples who “share the 
same religion, denomination or mode of worship”.(148) 
Closely intertwined with this question lays the crux of the problem, i.e. 
how to identify a group, be it national, ethnic, racial or religious. Indeed, 
ICTR was faced with the thorny problem of the distinction – and the nature 
thereof – between Hutus and Tutsi who allegedly belonged hence to two 
different “ethnic” groups. To this effect, the Tribunal made recourse in turn 
to identity cards(149) as well as to testimony of witness as proof of the 
appurtenance. These two elements of evidence reveal in fact two different 
approaches to the question, i.e. the objective and subjective ones. The 
former emphasizes on the external standpoint, in other words how peoples 
are seen and categorized from the outside world (identity cards,(150) official 
and public statements, etc.)(151) whilst the latter stresses on the self-
perception, in sum how the individual concerned sees himself and hence 
considers himself as belonging to one group or not. As the Court seemed to 
hint that the two approaches must be combined hence yielding to a 
“combined subjective-objective approach”. (152) In another case, though, 
ICTR, bound to elaborate on the characteristics of a ethnic group, observes 
that the appurtenance to it has to depend on three (alternate) criteria: a) 
the individuals have to share a common langue and culture (i.e. objective 
                                      
(147) Ibid., para. 514. The Tribunal seems to insist that in order to demonstrate the 
appurtenance of an individual to a “racial” group, priority must be given to the 
genotype (genetic identity) in lieu of the phenotype (its appearance or morphology). 
The question was far from being academic in the Rwandan case where the distinction 
between Hutus and Tutsis was “popularly” based on physical traits which might be 
more easily observed than the “genetic heritage”. Likewise: ICTR, The Prosecutor v. 
Clément Kayishema and Obeda Ruzindana, 1999, para. 98. 
(148) Ibid., para. 515. Likewise: ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obeda 
Ruzindana, 1999, para. 98. 
(149) Ibid., paras. 123, 170.  
(150) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obeda Ruzindana, 1999, para. 
35.   
(151) In Nazi Germany, for instance, the obligation to bear openly – sown on a garment 
– the Star of David (better “Shield of David”) made to the German Jews was a clear 
“mark” of appurtenance to a religious group.  
(152) ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para. 191 (p. 124).  
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elements), or b) they consider themselves as belonging to the group 
(victim’s subjective element), or c) they are identified (perceived) as such by 
the outside world, including and especially, by the author of the genocide 
(author’s subjective element).(153) Hence, this case would tend to 
corroborate the thesis according to which, in view of grasping a group, a 
tribunal has to make recourse to three alternate (subjective and objective) 
elements. Yet again, in another case, ICTR stresses even further the 
subjective element; assuming that the very concept of group under the 1948 
UN Convention (bar the national ones, which is objectively and more easily 
assessable) does not enjoy a universal definition, the Tribunal reaches the 
conclusion that this concept is definitely more subjective that objective. 
Therefore, what matters is how the victim is perceived by the author (“mens 
rea”) of the genocide as belonging to the group in point; alternatively, it may 
be made recourse to the self-interpretation by the victim himself. In sum, 
the two sides of the subjective approach may concur to the identification of 
the group, first, and to the appurtenance, then, of the victim to it.  
 
II.1.6.2.4. Crime of genocide as opposed to Crime 
against humanity 
 
The comparison between these two international crimes is in all regards 
evident, not least because the two share a common origin, better, as it has 
been previously outlined crime of genocide is historically speaking a species 
of a wider category of crimes, i.e. CAH. Indeed, as the District Court of 
Jerusalem (Israel) stated in the famous Eichmann case:  
“It is hardly necessary to add that the ‘crime against the Jewish 
People”, which constitutes the crime of ‘genocide’ is nothing but the 
gravest type of ‘crime against humanity’ (and all the more so because 
both under Israeli law and under the UN 1948 Convention a special 
intention is requisite for its commission of a ‘crime against 
humanity’). Therefore, all that has been said in the Nuremberg 
                                      
(153) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obeda Ruzindana, 1999, para. 
98: “An ethnic group is one whose members share a common language and culture; or, 
a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self-identification); or, a group identified as 
such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others)”. 
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principles on the ‘crime against humanity’ applies a fortiori to the 
‘crime against the Jewish People’”(154) 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that as far as the “actus reus” is concerned 
their similarities far exceed the scarce oddities.(155) In both cases: a) we are 
faced to grave crimes committed by individuals; b) they are not made up 
from isolated behaviours disconnected between them, on the contrary they 
are underpinned by a plan or policy; c) very often, it is the fact of a State or 
at the very least with the latter’s acquiescence or even connivance; d) 
criminal acts are targeted against civilian population (in this respect they 
differ substantially from crimes of war). Due to the profound similarities 
with regard to the material acts comprised by these two crimes, quite a few 
overlaps may occur between genocide and CAH. In fact, to kill all the 
members of a protected group (national, ethnic, religious or racial) in a 
systematic and widespread manner “with intent to destroy” it, constitutes 
both a genocide and a CAH.(156) On the contrary, torture arbitrary 
imprisonment make up a CAH whilst to kill human beings belonging to 
anyone of the protected groups result (only) in a genocide.  
Hence, if there are some differences between them, and there are 
indeed, they must lay perforce on the plane of mens rea, where in effect no 
overlap can be found. As it has been authoritatively observed, while is 
irrefutable that “all true crimes require proof of intent”(157), that of 
genocide stands apart from the other international crimes insofar as the 
mens rea is specially characterized, thence the so-called “dolus specialis” or 
special intent.(158) 
                                      
(154) Israel v. Eichmann, Supreme Court of Jerusalem, judgement of 29/05/1962, ILR, 
vol. 36 para. 26. Likewise: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1995, paras. 139-141. 
(155) For instance, forcible deportation is comprised within CAH and does not amount 
to a crime of genocide: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, 2001, para. 519; ICTY, 
The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 519. 
(156) On the overlaps between CAH and crime of genocide, see: ICTR, The Prosecutor 
v. Kyieshima and Ruzindana, 1999, paras. 628-636. 
(157) W. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, Cambridge, 
2001, p. 213.  
(158) “Special intent is a well-known criminal law concept in the Roman-continental 
legal systems. It is required as a constitutive element of certain offences and demands 
that the perpetrator have the clear intent to cause the offence charged. According to 
this meaning, special intent is the key element of an intentional offence, which offence 
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As regards CAH, historically the parent crime of genocide, one has to 
verify the intent to commit (“dolus generalis”) one of the constitutive 
material (and criminal) acts in addition of the knowledge of the “widespread 
or systematic attack”(159) against the civilian population. Instead, with 
respect to genocide, one has to determine the quintessential “special 
intent” (dolus specialis) to “destroy in whole or in part” one of the targeted 
groups, in addition to the “general intent” underpinning the killing or any 
other of the material acts encompassed by the definition of the crime of 
genocide. As the ICTR stated in its landmark case: 
“Genocide is distinct from other crimes inasmuch as it embodies a 
special intent or dolus specialis. Special intent of a crime is the 
specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, 
which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act 
charged. Thus, the special intent in the crime of genocide lies in ‘the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such’”(160) 
For instance, persecution represents by all means a CAH if discrimination is 
carried out in widespread scale. Under the scenario of genocide, discrimination 
is required too, but one has also to determine the “special intent” to destroy in 
whole or in part the group”. In a nutshell, one might resume the major 
differences between crime of genocide and CAH from the standpoint of mens 
rea, with two simple words: quantity vs quality. The former underlies the CAH 
(widespread and systematic attack) and normally requires huge numbers whilst 
the latter features the crime of genocide which focus on the contrary on the 
“special intent” enabling thus to distinguish a mere killing from genocide 
through killing if performed with the aim of destroying the group to which the 
victim belongs. In other words, special intent required by PIL for a crime of 
                                                                                                    
is characterized by a psychological relationship between the physical result and the 
mental state of the perpetrator”, ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, 
para. 518. Likewise: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 520. 
(159) The element of “plan” which may prove the systematic character of a CAH must 
not be mistaken with the “special intent” required for the crime of genocide, even 
though the two concepts may share some commonalities: “although a specific plan to 
destroy does not constitute an element of genocide, it would appear that it is not easy 
to carry out a genocide without a plan or organization”, ICTR, The Prosecutor v. 
Kyieshima and Ruzindana, 1999, para. 94. 
(160) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 498. 
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genocide to be committed may palliate the huge numbers (widespread) 
needed for the commission of a CAH.(161) 
Lastly, in the case of a simultaneous perpetration of a crime of genocide 
and a CAH – for the same material act – then the former encompasses and 
absorbs the latter,(162) hence revealing its graver nature compared to the 
CAH, since it shows a special (thus aggravated) intent to destroy in whole or 
in part a protected group.  In this connection, and on the account of the 
focus placed by the crime of genocide on quality instead of quantity, it is not 
worthless to address the question whether a genocide might perpetrated by 
a single individual, a rare hypothesis that cannot be yet excluded at least 
from a conceptual standpoint.(163) In the Genocide case, the World Court 
tackles indirectly this crucible question in connection with the germane 
issue of determining the “ ‘part’ of the ‘group’ for the purposes of Article II” 
of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. The ICJ considers then that both the 
“substantiality requirement” (i.e., the victims’ toll) and the “qualitative 
approach”(164) cannot “stand alone” and hence they concur jointly to verify 
the conditions set out by Article II of the UN 1948 Genocide Convention. 
                                      
(161) “This Trial Chamber emphasises that in view of the requirement of a surplus of 
intent, it is not necessary to prove a de facto destruction of the group and therefore 
concludes that it is not necessary to establish, with the assistance of a demographer, 
the size of the victimised population in numerical terms. It is the genocidal dolus 
specialis that predominantly constitutes the crime”, ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 
2003, para. 522. 
(162) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Kyieshima and Ruzindana, 1999, paras. 628 ff. 
(163) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 1999, paras. 100-101. In the case in point, the 
Tribunal, while admitting in asbtracto such hypothesis – provided that the single killing 
took place within and in accordance with a plan (i.e. a genocidal policy) –, established 
that the accused randomly killed the victim and not in the pursuance of a plan, thence 
the lack of “special intent”. Indeed, later on the Tribunal made clear that “The Trial 
Chamber observes, however, that it will be very difficult in practice to provide proof of 
the genocidal intent of an individual if the crimes committed are not widespread and if 
the crime charged is not backed by an organisation or a system”. It is hard to not agree 
with this finding.  
(164) I.e. : “If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group leaders?, 
or is essential to its survival women?, that may support a finding that the part 
qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4 (of the ICTY Statute which 
exactly reproduces Article II of the Convention”, ICJ’s quoting ICTY case (The 
Prosecutor v. Krstic, 2004, para. 12), para. 200.  
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Furthermore, in the Akayesu case, ICTR makes the finding according to 
which a single victim is sufficient to substantiate genocide if the intent to 
destroy partially or entirely the group in point is proved. However, the 
Tribunal seems to override the literal interpretation of its Statute (which 
mentions “killing members of the group”, i.e. plural)(165) for the benefit of 
the teleological means of interpretation.(166) 
 
 
   Genocide Crime against 
Humanity 
War Crimes Crime against Peace 
Nurnberg 
Tribunal(167) 
-------(168) Art. 6 litt. c) Art. 6 litt. b) Art. 6 litt. a) 
1948 Convention(169) Art. 2    
I.C.T.Y. Statute(170) Art. 4 Art. 5 Art. 3 ------ 
I.C.T.R. Statute(171) Art. 2 Art. 3 Art. 4 ------ 
Rome Statute 
(ICC)(172) 
Art. 6 Art. 7 Art. 8 Art. 8 bis (173) 
                                      
(165) Article 2 (2) a) ICTR Statute. 
(166) Both find their place in the toolbox of interpretation of international treaties. See 
infra VII.2.4.5.2. 
(167) Nurnberg International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945): 
http://www.icrc.org/dih. 
(168) It was at that time subsumed under the heading “crime against of humanity”, as 
one of its illustrative components.  
(169) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 
December 1948). An authoritative commentary of this fundamental multilateral 
convention may be found in: The UN Genocide Convention – A Commentary, ed. by P. 
Gaeta, Oxford, 2009.  
(170) UNSC Res. 827 (25 May 1993). 
(171) UNSC Res. 955 (8 November 1994). 
(172)http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rome+Statute. Htm. An 
authoritative commentary of the cornerstone of contemporary international criminal 
law can be found in: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ed. by A. 
Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones, Oxford, 2002. 
(173) Art. 5 § of the 1998 Rome Statute provides that: “The Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance 
with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under 
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision 
Synoptic Table of International Crimes 
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III. Procedural Law: The Repression of International Crimes 
Quite intuitively PIL, as a province of Law, is made up of substantive and 
institutional norms; criminal international law makes of course no 
exception. Indeed, PIL has established domestic and international repression 
mechanisms for the violation of individual’s conducts which are qualified as 
international crimes. It consists of the aforementioned trilogy of 
international crimes expressed by the IMT Statute (war crimes, crimes 
against peace and crimes against humanity) and the crime of genocide 
(emancipated from this latter category to attain its own autonomy). 
As in other provinces of PIL, the guarantee of international criminal 
norms is carried out both on the international and on the municipal plane. 
The following subsections will deal respectively with both of them. 
 
III.1. The Domestic Implementation of International Criminal 
Responsibility 
 
From an historical standpoint, domestic punishment has emerged as the 
first means of sanction of international crimes and for quite a long-time, 
despite several attempts in Modern History, has remained the sole 
mechanism permitting the enforcement of this province of PIL. This 
historical fact is the outcome of the weak institutionalization of the 
international legal order especially in this field. Failing an international, or at 
very least of a multinational tribunal, international punishment could hardly 
be envisaged. (174) Therefore, it was, and it can be argued that it is still 
roughly the same nowadays, up to States to proceed to crime repression, 
through the means of domestic judiciary mechanisms, and according to the 
                                                                                                    
shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”. 
During the review session of the Assembly of the State Parties (13th meeting, Kampala, 
11 June 2010), the crime of aggression was finally defined and inserted within the ICC 
jurisdiction (res. 6) under the heading of Art. 8 bis. See supra note 65. 
(174) S. Glaser, Infraction internationale, ses elements constitutifs et ses aspects 
juridiques, Paris, 1957, p. 31: “Les infractions internationales sont soumises, aussi 
longtemps qu’une jurisdiction criminelle internationale n’existe pas au régime de la 
répression ou de la compétence universelle. Dans ce régime, les auteurs de pareilles 
infractions peuvent être poursuivis et punis en quelque pays que ce soit, donc sans 
égard au lieu où l’infraction a été commise: Ubi te invenero, ibi te judicabo”. This 
excerpt has been quoted verbatim by the District Court of Jerusalem (Israel) in the 
Eichmann case (April-December 1961). 
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usual criteria of jurisdiction: a) ratione loci (or territorial criterion), the 
location where the crime was committed);(175) b) ratione personae (or 
personal criterion), which can be two-fold, both the nationality of the author 
of the crime and that of the victim of the crime.  
These three nexuses which allow linking the crime to State jurisdiction 
and ultimately the punishment, are provided for in States’ criminal code 
allowing them to prosecute and eventually punish the authors of the crime. 
Of course, as it happens in other criminal domains others than that of 
international crimes, several States may entertain jurisdiction over a single 
criminal act: a) the State over whose territory the crime has been 
committed; b) the State of nationality of the author of the criminal act; c) as 
well as the State of nationality of the victim of the criminal act. 
Alongside, with these jurisdictional criteria, PIL has established through 
either international treaties and customary international law what is called 
the universality principle or universal jurisdiction. According to this deep-
rotted procedural principle, any State can bring before justice the alleged 
criminal independently of his/her nationality, the victims’ nationality or 
where the crime was committed – as it occurred in the Pinochet case).(176) 
Indeed, the Nuremberg trilogy (plus genocide) created obligations for 
States: they must adopt this typology of crimes in their domestic legal order 
as well as allow the jurisdictional application in their own domestic legal 
order. This translates into universal competence, or universality of 
jurisdiction. However, the path leading to such universal jurisdiction went 
had to go through the exclusiveness of jurisdiction of the territorial State 
and that respectively of the offender’s and victim’s. As for the genocide, for 
                                      
(175) Article 6 of the 1948 Genocide Convention; in this regard the ICJ pointed out 
that: “Article VI only obliges the Contracting Parties to institute and exercise territorial 
criminal jurisdiction; while it certainly does not prohibit States, with respect to 
genocide, from conferring jurisdiction on their criminal courts based on criteria other 
than where the crime was committed which are compatible with international law, in 
particular the nationality of the accused, it does not oblige them to do so”, Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), cit. (2007), § 442 (at 226-227).  
(176) The criminal proceedings against were eventually dismissed and charges 
dropped since the offences in question occurred before the entry into force of the 
Convention against torture vis-à-vis UK which was requested by Spain to extradite 
Pinochet (former head of State of Chile).  
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instance, Article 6 of the 1948 Convention provides for the domestic 
criminal repression, i.e. that of the State on the territory of which the crime 
was perpetrated (locus commissi delicti).(177) This same article then goes on 
by establishing a parallel international criminal repression via an 
international jurisdiction to be created – the “International Penal Tribunal” – 
which will never actually materialise.(178) No special obligation in matters of 
extradition was introduced, aside from a mere statement to the point of 
referring to existing relevant treaties.(179) In fact, the rule establishing 
universal jurisdiction in matter of genocide emerged outside the Convention 
itself so that ultimately the latter was accordingly modified.  
Flowing from the principle of universal jurisdiction (an entitlement rule) is 
the aut dedere aut iudicare principle (a prescriptive rule), i.e. a State is 
bound to transfer an accused to another State willing and being able to 
prosecute the suspect(180) and thus to ignite the appropriate judicial 
proceedings,(181) if it not able or not willing do it itself. Moreover, States are 
bound to take all necessary means in order to prevent the punishable 
violations.(182) These alternative obligations allow States to coordinate their 
                                      
(177) Literally: the place where the criminal offense has been committed. 
(178) However, by virtue of a dynamic interpretation (of the 1948 Convention) the ICJ 
felt rightly confident to say that “co-operation with the ICTY constitutes an obligation 
stemming from(i.a.) … an obligation arising from its status as a party to the Genocide 
Convention” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), cit. (2007), § 
442 (at 228], notwithstanding thus the letter of the Convention itself which nowhere 
explicitly provides for such cooperation. Indeed, as it will be shown later on, dynamic 
interpretation represents a powerful tool for normative change in PIL.  
(179) Article 7 of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. 
(180) “Although Senegal is not required under the Convention to institute proceedings 
concerning acts that were committed before 26 June 1987, nothing in that instrument 
prevents it from doing so”, ICJ, Questions related to the Obligation to Prosecute or 
Extradite, 2012 § 102.  
(181) As the World Court recently held regarding the Convention against torture, 
(whose article 7 (1) provides for the these two obligations), the State concerned must 
abide by them “within a reasonable time” and “without delay”, even though the 
aforementioned convention does not set a precise time frame (ICJ, Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite, cit., §§ 114-115). By analogy, it can be inferred that such a 
temporal requirement is equally applicable under current general international law.  
(182) “It follows that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights 
and obligations erga omnes. The Court notes that the obligation each State thus has to 
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concurrent domestic jurisdictions. From this perspective, and despite the 
fact that most obligations are international, repression is articulated in the 
national sphere of the State. Several examples of national punishment can 
be cited in this respect: Eichmann, Barbie, Papon, Priebke, Kappler, etc. 
A few words must be spent with regard to the immunity an organ(183) of a 
State might enjoy before municipal tribunal prosecuting him or her for any 
of the aforementioned international crimes, when he (or she) is still in 
office.(184) In a case brought before it, the World Court asserted such 
immunity, though with a clear dismay from some authorities of PIL. The 
Court affirmed that: 
“in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic 
and consular agents, certain holders high-ranking office in a State, 
such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, 
both civil and criminal”(185)  
In sum, as long as one of these State’s organs holds is in office, he (or she) 
cannot be prosecuted by another State’s municipal tribunal in accordance 
with the principle of sovereign equality of States (Article 2 (1) UNC) and its 
procedural corollary, i.e.  “par in parem non habet iurisdictionem” (No 
                                                                                                    
prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the 
Convention”, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 1996, § 31, p. 
616; ICJ, Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 § 157 (at 199). 
(183) With regard to State’s and State organs immunities, see: G. Distefano, 2019 pp. 
122-133. 
(184) Indeed, it ought to be made clear that immunity is an exception to the principle 
recognizing a State to wield its criminal jurisdiction (and this is all the more true in the 
context of international crimes). As the ECHR adamantly affirmed a State organ cannot 
“plead immunity in respect of gross human rights violations”, such as torture or 
inhuman and degrading treatments (ECHR, Al-Adsani v. UK, Application n° 35763/97, 
Judgement of 21 November 2001 (Grand Chamber), § 24).  
(185) ICJ, Arrest Warrant, para. 51 (pp. 21-22). The Court is referring to the so-called 
“Troika” of a State in PIL (according to Article 7 § 2 (a) VCLT 1969, Head of State, Head 
of Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs), see: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 408-410. The 
Court – by analogy with article 29 VCDR stating the inviolability of a diplomatic agent – 
reiterated in a later case the uncontroversial existence of “international obligations 
regarding the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of foreign Heads 
of States”, ICJ, Questions of Mutual Assistance, 2008, para. 173 (p. 238).  
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dominium between equals). In recognizing this immunity, PIL hence seems 
to make no distinction between ordinary crimes committed by one of State 
organs (Rainbow Warrior) and major international crimes. The Court 
hastened, though, to add that  
“the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of 
any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. 
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal 
responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional 
immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question 
of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution 
for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the 
person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility”(186) 
In brief, prosecution by its own State or by any other State may be 
triggered when he (or she) will be no more in office (as it was rightly 
pretended with regard to Pinochet, for example); in this case immunity has 
ceased and cannot shield any more the beneficiary from a criminal 
proceedings.(187)  
More importantly, yet, an organ of State in office may be prosecuted, as 
it will be dealt with later on, by a competent international tribunal, before 
which, since the Nuremberg Trials, no such immunity may be invoked to 
dodge international punishment: 
“An incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be 
subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal 
courts, where they have jurisdiction”(188)  
Indeed, the principle of sovereign equality can no more be referred to 
build up a shield, since the jurisdiction is not wielded by a State but by the 
International Community through a treaty so empowered either by a treaty, 
either directly (such as the ICC) or indirectly (such UNCS established ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals). In both cases, States concerned have 
                                      
(186) Ibid., para. 60 (p. 26).  
(187) “After a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or 
she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other 
States, loc.cit. 
(188) Ibid., para. 61(p. 26). 
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discarded the rule of immunity recognized to their incumbent organs with a 
view to permit the exercise of international criminal jurisdiction.(189)  
Finally, in the light of individual’s asserted international personality, 
domestic repression must be distinguished from international repression, as 
it takes place within the States’ legal order and as such has no influence on 
the individual’s status. Thus, we cannot speak in terms of international 
subjectivity of the individual, when the repression is carried out in the 
domestic sphere before national courts.  
 
III.2. The International Implementation of International 
Criminal Responsibility 
 
III.2.1. The Two Ad hoc International Tribunals: ICTY and ICTR 
In the cases set under international instruments establishing repression 
mechanisms at the international level, the individual can be subjected to an 
international criminal trial.(190). Such a system was shaped by Article VII of 
the Convention for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
1948 – which provided for the creation of an “International Penal Tribunal” 
– but was never materialized.(191)  
Technically speaking in fact, and taking into account its genesis and its 
context, IMT of Nuremberg was not a genuine international (criminal) 
tribunal, but more accurately a multinational tribunal created by the 
victorious States against Nazi Germany with a view to prosecuting and 
                                      
(189) See infra III.2.3.2. 
(190) For example, see Art. 9 of the ICTY Statutes as well as Art. 1 combined with Art. 
17 of the ICC Statute which establishes the complementarity jurisdiction of the ICC in 
cases of non or lacking functioning of the Member States’ national criminal 
jurisdictions.  
(191) As a matter of fact, by this same resolution adopting the Genocide Convention, 
UNGA “invited” in its Part B “the International Law Commission to study the 
desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of 
persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be 
conferred upon that organ by international conventions”, Resolution 260 (III) of 9 
December 1948. As it will be shown further on, for the purposes of application of the 
1948 UN Genocide Convention, one might consider ICC as being the “international 
penal tribunal” referred to in its Article VI.  
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punishing major war criminals of the defeated State.(192) The four Allies 
indeed drew their power from their status of occupying powers under IHL. 
They thus administered criminal justice through the application of PIL which 
was of course applicable to Germany and over German territory (and State 
organs) as the “Law of the Land”.  
That’s why it is more correct to trace back the first true international 
tribunals to those created by the UNSC respectively in 1993 and 1994 with 
regard to former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In fact, the two conflicts, yet 
different in their legal nature and characteristics, awoke the legal 
conscience(193) of the international community through the action of the 
UNSC in the field of collective security.(194) After quite a few 
procrastinations, the UN organ vested with the “principal responsibility” for 
the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security 
decided to create first the ICTY – 1993 – and then ICTR – in 1994 -, that is to 
say two international criminal tribunals empowered to prosecute individuals 
having committed international crimes during these two conflicts.  
It was in effect the first time that an ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
had been established by a unilateral act of an organ of an IO. With regard to 
the situation in former Yugoslavia, the response from international 
community has not spared criticisms both for its delayed and its insufficient 
character. That’s why quite a few commentators saw in the creation of the 
ICTY a fig-leaf concocted with a view to saving the face of the UN and the 
international community at large. It was then hoped that its establishment 
had not only a retrospective effect – through the punishment – but also a 
deterrent effect over those potential authors of future criminal acts, since 
the conflict was still raging. The creation of the tribunal via the UNSC(195) was 
                                      
(192) The adjectival difference between international and multinational resonates 
mutatis mutandis as that regarding collective security between international forces 
and multinational forces. 
(193) On the exact meaning of this oft-abused formula, seeG. Distefano, 2019, pp. 559-
564.. 
(194) See: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1995, para. 32.. 
(195) In accordance with the UNC, all UN main bodies are endowed with the power to 
create subsidiary organs if necessary for the accomplishment of their mandate (Article 
7 (2) UNC). However, the establishment was challenged – and this contention duly 
rebutted – in the first case brought before the ICTY: The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 
1995, paras. 26-48. 
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the fruit of a joint proposal stemming from France, Germany and USA and 
was eventually preferred to the other solution consisting in its creation 
through the conclusion of international treaty, which would have required a 
much longer time to enter into force and thus for the tribunal to 
operate.(196) 
In both cases, UNSC resorted to the establishment of these two 
tribunals(197) after having duly determined that the UN was faced to a 
“threat of peace” thus allowing it to avail itself of coercive measures 
envisaged in UNC Chapter VII. The “threat of peace”, one of the three 
situations likely to trigger UNSC’s powers under this chapter, consisted, in 
the two cases in point, of : mass murders, acts of genocide, widespread and 
systematic violations of HR, ethnic cleansings, violations of “laws and 
customs of war”, etc.(198) 
Hence, by adopting its resolution 827 UNCS established ICTY and 
accordingly requested all Member States to fully cooperate with the tribunal 
for the purposes of prosecuting and punishing the authors of acts of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Articles 2 to 5 of the 
ICTY Statute, annexed to the aforementioned resolution). A year later,(199) 
UNSC adopted resolution 955 thereby establishing ICTR entrusted with the 
                                      
(196) It ought to be noted that whilst an external committee of internationally 
renowned jurists was entrusted with the task of drafting the ICTY Statute, the ICTR 
Statute was framed “in-house” through the recourse of the UN legal affairs 
department.   
(197) Statute of the international Court to judge the individuals allegedly responsible 
of grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, SC Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, ICTR Statute, 
SC Resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994. The last version of the text of the 
Statutes are available on the respective websites of these courts:  http://www.icty.org 
and http://www.ictr.org 
(198) With regard to the pregnant formula “threat to peace”, see: A.L. Graf-Brugère, La 
“menace contre la paix” dans la pratique du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. 
Réflexions sur un concept de droit international, Geneva, 2019. 
(199) UN rightly decided to act in the same way in the African continent, as it had 
previously done with regard to the situation in former Yugoslavia, lest international 
community might have thought of a double standard of action. Furthermore, the new 
Rwandan government, which seized power after the civil war, asked the UNSC to act 
likewise.  
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mandate of prosecuting and punishing the authors of genocide,(200) crimes 
against humanity and of violations of common Article 3 to the four GE 1949 
and their P/II 1977 (Articles 2 to 4 of the ICTR Statute).(201) The 
aforementioned provisions aimed thus at defining both tribunals’ 
jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
Ratione loci, i.e. territorial jurisdiction, encompassed, as far as ICTY is 
concerned, all criminal facts occurred on the territory of former Yugoslavia, 
whilst ICTR’s was confined to the territory of the Rwandan State. However, 
with the regard to the latter, the Tribunal may entertain any claim based on 
criminal acts perpetrated by Rwandan nationals on neighbour States’ 
territories (the territorial extension of the ICTR’s jurisdiction is hence limited 
having regard to its goal, i.e. the punishment of criminal acts perpetrated 
during the civil war in Rwanda, notably, yet not exclusively, genocide).  
Ratione temporis, i.e. temporal jurisdiction, ICTR’s jurisdiction is clearly 
determined: all criminal acts committed between January 1st and December 
31st, 1994. The temporal dimension of ICTY is instead a bit more complex, 
insofar while the dies a quo (the commencement) has been fixed at January 
1st, 1991 (in accordance with Article 8 of the ICTY Statute and paragraph of 
the UNSC resolution 827), the setting of dies ad quem (the end) was left for 
a further determination by the UNSC “upon the restoration of peace” in 
former Yugoslavia’s territories.(202)  
A crucible aspect related to the exercise by the two ad hoc tribunals of 
their jurisdiction was related to the concurrence of domestic jurisdiction 
with domestic courts of States, precisely by virtue of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. By virtue of Articles 9 ICTY and 8 ICTR Statutes – which 
affirm the concurrence of jurisdiction (paragraph 1) –, both tribunals “shall 
                                      
(200) In both ad hoc tribunals, ratione personae jurisdiction was limited to physical 
persons and was not extended, contrariwise to the IMT’s, to legal corporations. 
(201) Contrariwise to the conflict which was eventually qualified as a IAC, thus allowing 
for the application of the four 1949 GE and their P/I 1977, the conflict in Rwanda – 
which feature by the way a strong genocide character both in its roots and its further 
developments – was a NIAC; hence, only claims based on the infringements to 
common Article 3 of the four 1949 GE and their P/II 1997 could be entertained by the 
ICTR. In both cases, ad hoc tribunals Statutes were annexed to the respective UNSC 
resolutions purporting to their creation.  
(202) ICTY, In re The Republic of Macedonia I, Trial Chamber, October 4, 2002.  
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nonetheless have the primacy over the national courts of all States. At any 
stage of the procedure, the … Tribunal … may formally request national 
courts to defer to its competence in accordance with the present Statute 
and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence”. Hence, the two international 
criminal tribunals have been endowed by the UNSC, by virtue of its powers 
under Chapter VII alongside with Article 103 of the UNC,(203) with a true 
primacy over municipal courts. By way of consequence, in accordance to the 
principle “ne bis in idem”,(204) the latter cannot re-trial an individual who has 
already been tried – for the same acts – by the ICTY or ICTR; instead, a 
individual may be re-tried by ICTY or ICTR, but: 
“only if: (a) The act for which he or she was tried was characterised as an 
ordinary crime; or (b)  The national court proceedings were not impartial 
or independent, were designed to shield the accused from international 
criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted”(205)  
The principle of primacy of the two international criminal tribunals 
pursues also the aim of ensuring that States truly cooperate with the 
requests issued by them, such as ; information, witness and of course the 
referral of suspects. Further, UN did not entertain a profound trust of the 
fairness of justice delivered by municipal courts in the States concerned, i.e. 
States belonging to former Yugoslavia.(206)  
In 2003, UNSC adopted resolution 1503 whose paragraph states the 
following: “Calls on the ICTY and the ICTR to take all possible measures to 
complete investigations by the end of 2004 (date at which the final 
indictments were accordingly issued), to complete all trial activities at first 
instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all work in 2010 (the 
Completion Strategies)”.(207) However, UNSC couldn’t fail to note that this 
                                      
(203) See: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 262-265. 
(204) See: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 575-577. 
(205) Article 2 (1) ICTR Statute; Article 10 (2) ICTY Statute has an identical content. 
(206) It was in effect fretted that, in order to defeat any incrimination from the 
international tribunal concerned, the accused could be tried by a benevolent municipal 
jurisdiction; the opposite phenomenon had also to be averted, i.e. a suspect tried by a 
malevolent jurisdiction. In both cases, there was a true danger of an unfair trial.  
(207) Further, according to UNSC resolution 1534 (2004), “assessments on the 
progress made towards implementation of the completion strategy of the Tribunal” 
are to be submitted to the UNSC every six months.  
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strategy did not fully work and in 2010 it adopted resolution 1966 according 
to which it:  
“Decides to establish the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals (“the Mechanism”) with two branches, which shall 
commence functioning on 1 July 2012 (branch for the ICTR) and 1 July 
2013 (branch for the ICTY), respectively (“commencement dates”), 
and to this end decides to adopt the Statute of the Mechanism in 
Annex 1 to this resolution;”(208) 
Hence, in accordance with this resolution, ICTY and ICTR have henceforth 
merged(209) in a single institution deemed to complete its works within the 
following timelines: a) with regard to the ICTY, 4 years after July 1st, 2013; b) 
with regard to the ICTR, 4 years after July 1st, 2012. After these dates, the 
Mechanism continues to operate as a stand-alone institution. At the same 
time “lower- or intermediate-rank accused to the Chamber” were to be 
referred to a special chamber established to this effect, in order to relieve 
the burden of the Mechanism.  
A few years after the end of functioning of these two tribunals, it is not 
unworthy to briefly take stock of their works and impact on PIL. On the asset 
side, it is beyond any doubt that both tribunals have helped crystallised, 
strengthened and developed the substantive body of international criminal 
law. It is hence not too bold to affirm that thanks to their jurisprudence, 
this, until then quite less-developed, field of PIL has undergone a dramatic 
                                      
(208) As acknowledged by this same resolution itself, “administrative and budgetary 
aspects” linked to the functioning of both international criminal tribunals played a role 
in the establishment of this “Mechanism”, deemed to accelerate the trials and 
streamline the two institutions. Another key means aimed at accelerating the 
completion of the ICTY’s works was the “establishment under the auspices of the High 
Representative and early functioning of a special chamber within the State Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (the “War Crimes Chamber”) and the subsequent referral by 
the ICTY of cases of lower- or intermediate-rank accused to the Chamber,” (ibid., 11th 
preambulary section). Since then, UNSC review the progress of the work of the 
Mechanism every two years. 
(209) It is interesting to observe that while this merger was decided in order to 
expedite the works of the two ad hoc tribunals, an opposite decision was taken with, 
though, the same aim. In 2003, UNSC decided to appoint a separate chief prosecutor 
for the ICTR, which was until then and since the beginning the same as ICTY’s 
(paragraph 8 and Annex I to UNSC resolution 1503).  
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expansion. Furthermore, the two tribunals’ jurisprudence has spilled over on 
another province of PIL, i.e. IHL which has greatly benefited not only, 
obviously, with regard to war crimes but also in respect of CAH. One may 
even put forward that the henceforth these two provinces of PIL have 
nourished mutually and have tightened their ties between them. On a more 
practical note, one has to observe that all the suspects have been eventually 
brought before the two tribunals; that’s far from being a minor victory 
taking into account the flaws of municipal criminal courts of the States 
concerned and the fact that it was only in 2002 that a permanent 
international criminal jurisdiction was established. In a different, yet non un-
related, register, this these two ad hoc tribunals have contributed, to 
varying extent, to the reconciliation between the populations scarred by 
these terrible conflicts. They have hence enabled the punishment of the 
most heinous international crimes and might in the long-term serve as a 
deterrent for future crimes elsewhere in the world. Finally, one does not 
have to underscore the impact, again in the long-term, of the judicial truth – 
determined by the two tribunals – on the historical narrative. It is then 
today too early to assess the actual legacy of these two international ad hoc 
tribunals.  
On the negative side, it has been contended, quite rightly in fact, the high 
functioning cost of the two tribunals; as it has been earlier observed, this 
was one of the reasons leading to the implementation of the “completion 
strategy”. On a more technical key, it was harshly criticized the impossibility 
for both tribunals to render a judgement in absentia as well as for the civil 
parties to appear before the tribunals other than as simple witnesses. On a 
conceptual registry, it has been asserted, more or less rightly, that the mere 
existence of an international criminal tribunal might have induced States not 
to prosecute internally these crimes. On a germane plane, it was noted, too, 
that a two-speed criminal justice has popped up on the account of these 
two ad hoc tribunals for the same crimes whether their authors are 
prosecuted before them or before municipal courts: a) capital punishment, 
contrariwise to many domestic criminal legislations, could not be inflicted by 
the two international tribunals; b) conditions of imprisonment are generally 
far better in the Netherlands (or in another country willing to accept 
offender in their gaols) than elsewhere in the world; c) judicial guarantees 
offered by the international process are far better too since they meet all 
the stringent international UN standards. On a different note, some States 
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and scholars alike have voiced criticism in regard of the jurisprudence of the 
two international tribunals; critiques range from its excessive development 
(de lege ferenda) not always genuinely mirroring current state of customary 
international law, to its technical inaccuracies, especially in matter of IHL. 
Finally, and the present author may share the perplexities of this last strand 
of criticism, it has been held that justice, all the more criminal justice, 
rendered far away from the site of the crime might have less impact on the 
human society concerned, thus voiding one of the aims of criminal justice, 
i.e. the satisfaction of the victims as well as its deterrent function related 
hereto.  
III.2.2. Hybrid Criminal Tribunals or the (varying) 
Internationalization of Municipal Criminal Justice 
 
Before delving into the ICC, one has to note that another category of 
criminal jurisdictions has seen the light in the wake of the establishment of 
the two ad hoc tribunals by the UNSC, that is to say the so-called “mixed” or 
“internationalised” criminal tribunals. Having in mind the limited and 
specific purpose of this contribution, we will but briefly dwell on them. Of 
course, the hybrid character (between domestic and international 
dimension) is highly variable among them; hence, following the criterion of 
the increasing internationalization of the administration of criminal justice, 
one shall have to cite in the first place the system established (indirectly) by 
UNSC resolution 1244 in Kosovo, which provided for a “civil section” within 
the UN peace-keeping forces, the MINUK. The possibility was thus left open 
to appoint a foreign judge – sitting in the bench of municipal courts – in 
order to shatter the image of an unfair domestic criminal system.  This 
solution is in effect the closest possible to an exclusive domestically 
rendering of criminal justice, yet with a light touch of internationalisation.  
The second case is represented by East-Timor, where the UNSC had sent 
a peace-keeping force – INTERFET (“International Force for East Timor”) – 
with the aim of accompanying the Timorese people to the independence, 
after its struggle against unlawful and illegal Indonesian occupation 
(following decolonization from Portugal). Due to the sheer absence of 
judiciary, UN decided to establish a tribunal in Dili entrusted with the task of 
trying international crimes. In view of managing this newly founded judicial 
system, the UNTAET (“United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor”), carried out the function of training local judges. In addition, to the 
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(international) training, international jurists have been appointed by the 
UNTAET to sit on the bench so that at the end a mix of domestic and 
international judges made up the new judiciary the mandate of which is to 
try authors of international crimes during the war of national liberation 
against Indonesia. As far as applicable law is concerned, it is noteworthy to 
observe that failing a proper municipal code envisaging international crimes, 
UN has framed the required substantive and procedural law to this effect. 
The three major crimes (bar then the crime against peace) are defined in the 
same manner as in the 1998 Rome Statute, which is thus considered as a 
genuine mirror of customary international law in this matter as it existed 
(already) during the war of national liberation against Indonesia. However, 
the system has not been hitherto noticeably brilliant.  
The third – and hitherto the last in time – example of a hybrid criminal 
tribunal is that of Lebanon. On December 13th, 2005, the Government of 
Lebanon requested to the UN to establish a tribunal – having thus an 
international character – entrusted with the task to try the authors of the 
attack leading to the killing of Mr. Rafic Hariri, former Lebanon’s PM, as 
wells as of 22 other peoples. In accordance to UNSC resolution 1664 (2006), 
UN and the Government of Lebanon have negotiated an international 
agreement aiming at the establishment of the future “Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon” (STL). Hence, following UNSC resolution 1757 (2007), the 
provisions contained in the document annexed thereto – regarding the 
creation and the Statute of the STL – entered into force on June 10, 2007, 
thus leading to the actual creation of the STL. As specified earlier, the 
mandate of the Tribunal is to try the authors of a bomb attack having led to 
the death of Mr. Rafic Hariri and other 22 persons; having regard to the 
complex religious dimensions and the intricacies – both social and political – 
inherited from a lengthy civil war (including more than a couple of foreign 
unlawful invasions from Israel and Syria), the set up of a “mixed” tribunal 
deemed to establish the judicial truth over the violent death of a leading 
Lebanon political figure, was considered the best if not the only available 
solution to this effect. For these same reason, it was decided that the seat of 
the tribunal “shall have its seat outside Lebanon” (Article 1 of the Annex to 
UNSC resolution 1757) and was eventually based at The Hague. STL’s 
jurisdiction might extend even before and after the aforementioned attack 
(i.e. between October 1st, 2004 and December 12th, 2005), if it determines 
that other terrorist attacks occurred in Lebanon have had, according to well-
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founded general principles of criminal law, a nexus with the terrorist attack 
of February 14, 2005 and provided that they present a similar gravity and 
nature. The nexus in point may include, without being limited to: “a 
combination of the following elements: criminal intent (motive), the 
purpose behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the pattern 
of the attacks (modus operandi) and the perpetrators” (Article 1 of the 
Annex to UNSC resolution 1757). With regard to the structure of the STL, it is 
made up of a Prosecutor, a Registry, a Defence office and of course of three 
Chambers: pre-trial (one international judge), trial (one Lebanese and two 
international judges) and an appeals chamber (two Lebanese and three 
international judges).  Hence, the international character, which is clearly 
mirrored in the composition of the STL, is not though found in the applicable 
law, insofar the Tribunal may only apply, according to Article 2 of its Statute 
(annexed to UNSC resolution 1757), Lebanese law and more precisely: “a) 
provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and 
punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and 
personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and 
offences, including the rules regarding the material elements of a crime, 
criminal participation and conspiracy; and (b) Articles 6 and 7 of the 
Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on “Increasing the penalties for sedition, 
civil war and interfaith struggle”.”. However, late STL President Prof. Cassese 
demonstrated in a widely resonating decision that there exists a customary 
(general) definition of terrorism; hence, since customary international law 
applies to (and within) every State, then this definition is an integral part of 
Lebanese law. According to Professor Cassese, the international crime of 
terrorism possesses: 
“the following three key elements: (i) the perpetration of a criminal 
act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or 
threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the 
population (which would generally entail the creation of public 
danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international 
authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when 
the act involves a transnational element.”(210) 
                                      
(210) STL, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I (February 16, 
2011), para. 85. 
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This conceptualization of the crime of terrorism as well as the very 
determination of its existence in customary international law has raised 
some criticism from a few scholars. Yet, and the present author profoundly 
share the finding of late Professor Cassese, this decision remains one of the 
most potent legacies of this distinguished jurist and, as far STL is concerned, 
it surely permitted the tribunal to avoid the dire consequences of lack of 
definition in PIL and thus within Lebanese Law. Finally, as the very STL 
website prides itself to underscore, the Tribunal, notwithstanding its 
tormented genesis (in fact quite similar to all the other hybrid tribunals) and 
functioning(211), presents some “unique features”: a) the existence of an 
autonomous pre-trial chamber; b) the existence of a Defence offices as an 
integral part of the STL itself; c) the possibility of in absentia trials; d) the 
participation of the victims to the proceedings (without though having the 
right to seek compensation before it); e) a true terrorism trial. 
A fourth example is that of “Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of 
Cambodia” mandated to deal with the Cambodian genocide occurred during 
the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) until the Vietnamese invasion of this 
country.(212) Since Hun Sen’s rise to power in 1993 as Prime Minister, he 
endeavoured to establish a judicial system with a view to trying the crimes 
committed during this period; however, this purely domestic attempt faced 
manifold difficulties and eventually aborted. The solution was then found 
out through cooperation with the UN and an agreement was finally 
concluded on June 6, 2003 between the latter and the Cambodian 
Government (“Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia concerning the prosecution under Cambodian law 
of crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea”) which 
led to the establishment of “extraordinary chambers” entrusted with the 
task of trying were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of 
Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and 
international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed 
during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979” (Article 1). The 
Chambers consisted of a Trial Chamber – composed by three Cambodian 
                                      
(211) Not to mention the early demise of its President, the world-renowned Law 
Professor Antonio Cassese.  
(212) Initially, the Vietnamese tribunals had sentenced to death Khmer Rouge’s leader 
Pol Pot (and some of his acolytes), but the Vietnamese reverted finally to a general 
amnesty in order to find an agreement with the new Cambodian rulers.  
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judges and two international judges – and of Supreme Court Chamber – 
made up of four Cambodian judges and three international judges (Article 
3). It appears evident that in each of the two degrees of jurisdiction there is 
(decisive) majority of Cambodian judges. Applicable law is not referred to in 
this agreement, but it is instead mentioned in a domestic law to be adopted 
by Cambodia. The bill in question (promulgated in 2004 not without a 
subsequent amendment) provides that the crimes falling within the 
compass of the “extraordinary chambers” are the following: a) homicide, 
torture, religious persecution as defined in Cambodian Penal Code (Article 3 
new); b) genocide (Article 4 makes an explicit renvoi to the 1948 UN 
Genocide convention); c) CAH (Article 5);(213) d) “grave breaches” of the four 
1949 GE  (Article 6);(214) e) “the destruction of cultural property during 
armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention for Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict” (Article 7); f) “crimes 
against internationally protected persons pursuant to the Vienna 
Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations” (Article 8). Jurisdiction ratione 
personae was unsurprisingly limited to physical persons regardless of their 
nationality and of course that of the victims. 
The fifth example is that of Sierra Leone after civil war which devastated 
this country as well as one of its neighbour States, Liberia. The “Special 
Court for Sierra Leone” (SCSL)(215) was created thanks to an international 
agreement(216) concluded in 2002 between Sierra Leone and the UN 
represented by its Secretary-General.(217) The judiciary so established is 
though an independent system outside the UN which aims at recovering a 
                                      
(213) The lits of acts falling within the competence of this tribunal are much shorter 
than, for instance, Article 7 ICC’s: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, 
other inhumane acts. 
(214) By inserting this crime among those falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 
it was – rightly – determined the international nature of the armed conflict.  
(215) The headquarters of the SCSL are based in Freetown, except for the trial of 
former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, whose has been held at The Hague. He was 
eventually convicted on April 2012 on 11 charges ranging from war crimes to CAH. It is 
noteworthy to SCSL has been the first international criminal tribunal to sentence a 
sitting head of State since IMT.  
(216) The Statute of SCSL is annexed to the aforementioned agreement.  
(217) Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone signed on 16 January 2002. 
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collapsed municipal judicial system whose last sentence went back to 
1991…(218) The agreement provides for the establishment of a tribunal made 
up of two levels: Trial and Appeals Chamber. In both of them sit foreign 
(majority) and national judges who, according to the Statute of SCSL, are 
bound to apply: a) PIL related to CAH (Article 2); b) violations of Common 
Article 3 to the 4 1949 GE thus allowing the Tribunal to punish authors of 
crimes of war (Article 1); c) “other serious violations of IHL” (Article 4); and 
finally d) “Crimes under Sierra Leonean Law” (Article 5). Roughly speaking 
and save the last item of applicable law, SCSL’s jurisdiction ratione materiae 
is similar to that of the ICTR; this is unsurprising since in both cases there 
had been a civil war, though with a further complication for the Sierra 
Leonean case due to the implication of Liberia. SCSL’s jurisdiction ratione 
loci is limited to one of the aforementioned crimes perpetrated over Sierra 
Leonean territory regardless of the nationality of its victim and/or its author; 
ratione temporis, only the dies a quo (i.e. the commencement of the 
temporal jurisdiction) is defined (Article 1), while the setting of the dies ad 
quem (i.e. the end) has been left to the assessment by the SCSL. Finally, the 
latter’s jurisdiction ratione personae encompasses all “person(s) persons 
who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed  … including those 
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment 
of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone” (Article 1 
(1)).(219) In 2013 SCLS has completed its mandate and it has been 
transformed into a residual mechanism, not dissimilar to that of ICTY and 
ICTR.(220) 
Lastly, what does the future hold for hybrid tribunals? Obviously, an 
important element of the answer rests with the ultimate efficacy of these 
                                      
(218) SCSL is the first international (or better hybrid) criminal tribunal to be funded by 
voluntary contributions.  
(219) The exceptions to this provision are members of the peace-keeping operations – 
either under the umbrella of UN or any other regional organization – who remain 
within “the primary jurisdiction of the sending State” (Article 1 (2)). However, if the 
latter is unwilling or unable to prosecute its own national then SCSL may, “if authorized 
by the Security Council on the proposal of any State, exercise jurisdiction over such 
persons” (Article 1 (3)).  
(220) The transition to the Residual Mechanism meant a hugely reduced staff – both 
administrative and judicial (http://rscsl.org).  
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tribunals in each specific case; another hint mas be also found in the ICC 
itself and in its efficacy, too. If the ICC eventually meets the expectations of 
the international community at large, States may well resort to it and, 




III.2.3. ICC: a permanent international criminal jurisdiction: 
a Long-nurtured dream made True 
 
III.2.3.1. Introductory remarks 
 
The idea of a permanent international criminal court dates back at least 
to the Nineteenth century; for instance, one of the founding fathers of the 
Red Cross, Gustave Moynier,(221) considered the establishment of such 
tribunal as a natural, indeed necessary, institutional complement for the 
implementation of the newly developed IHL and thus with a view to 
punishing the authors of war crimes. Later on, a conspicuous number of 
jurists wish to create a special chamber – entrusted to prosecute and trial 
individual’s international crimes – within the future PCIJ, yet with no avail.  
The situation did not change at all after WWII and the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
– the successor of PCIJ – did not extend to international criminal 
responsibility. Hence, the creation by the UNSC of the two ad hoc tribunals 
renovated this old struggle for a permanent criminal justice by awaking the 
(legal) conscience of States and international community alike, theretofore 
in a state of torpor. The circumstances had never been in effect so 
favourable to this renaissance: conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Pinochet and Barbie cases, etc. not to mention the end of the Cold 
War and the need to revive an international order of which international 
criminal justice is certainly a pillar.  
                                      
(221) P. Boissier, Histoire du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge. De Solférino à 
Tsoushima, Paris, 1963; C.  K. Hall, “The first proposal for a permanent international 
criminal court”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 322. For the Text of the 
proposed 1872 draft by Gustave Moynier, see : 
 https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jp4m.htm or Willem-Jan van 
der Wolf, Claudia Tofan, Documentary history of the International Criminal Court. Part 
I, International Courts Association, 2008 (at 1). 
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On July 17, 1998 in Rome the diplomatic conference, convened by the 
UN, gave birth to the ICC Statute.(222) It would have not taken much for this 
attempt to be – again – unsuccessful, but thanks notably, to the enormous 
pressure of the NGOs as well as of the international civil society at large that 
this multilateral convention could finally see the day. The Rome Statute 
represents in certain respects a triumph of the internationalists (i.e. 
international jurists and diplomats alike) over (municipal) criminal law 
jurists.  
By making the ICC Statute, the international community establishes an 
international judicial body, entrusted with the task of trying individuals 
having committed international crimes. Contrariwise to the IMT (which 
remained, as said before, a multinational tribunal) and in fact to the two ad 
hoc tribunals, ICC is not created after a war by the victors to prosecute 
criminal acts perpetrated by the vanquished. Furthermore, another 
distinctive feature, ICC’s jurisdiction, again compared to the aforementioned 
tribunals, is not circumstantial but potentially universal (it other words it 
aims at covering the entire world).(223) 
In effect, ICC’s jurisdiction encroaches to that of States; unlike the two ad 
hoc international tribunals’ jurisdiction which principally infringed upon two 
States (i.e. respectively former Yugoslavia, for the ICTY,(224) and Rwanda, for 
the ICTR), ICC’s jurisdiction encroaches to all States parties to its Statute. As 
one may intuitively imagine, this feature of the ICC was not warmheartedly 
appreciated by all States,(225) especially, as it will be shown later on, by those 
                                      
(222) An authoritative and widely acclaimed Commentary may be suggested for 
further reading and enhanced knowledge: A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones, The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, Oxford, 2002.  
(223) To-date, 123 States are parties to the ICC Statute (yet only the two European 
Permanent Members of the UNSC are among them) whilst 139 have only signed it. 
According to Article 126 (1) of the Statute 60 States’ ratifications or accessions were 
needed for its entry into force; this happened the 1st of July 2002, i.e. one month after 
the 60th State has deposited its instrument of ratification.  
(224) To be more precise, one may include all States successors to former Yugoslavia, 
hence six in all in all.  
(225) For example, France fretted that its armed forces abroad – acting either under a 
UNSC authorization under Chapter (VII) or within a peace-keeping operations – might 
fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction (e.g. at the time of the making of ICC Statute France 
had some forces in former Yugoslavia). Inversely, Ivory Coast, which was enthusiast 
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States which are not parties to the Rome Statute. One shall not to forget 
that the latter is an international treaty; it has hence to be interpreted 
according to the customary international law principles codified in the 1969 
VCLT. Criminal law jurists, who make nowadays the bulk of the bench of the 
ICC, are not necessarily at ease with that and are not pleased either. 
Furthermore, the recourse to ICC’s travaux préparatoires might well left the 
jurist deeply unsatisfied since several questions remain in the dark; in fact, 
the negotiations were not particularly long in time: the Conference lasted a 
month only, while it took nearly 3 years to for the two ad hoc tribunals. 
statutes to be drafted The brevity of the negotiations alongside with the 
staunch resistance of some States – which took part at the Conference the 
avowed goal to torpedo it or at least to water down the final outcome – may 
explain why this text is the result of a manifold compromises which affects 
in some respects its legal consistency. Numerous contradictions, alas, 
punctuate it with the risk of weaken the overall structure; in addition, ICC 
Statute was adopted not by consensus by qualified majority (two-thirds of 
the present and voting States).(226) 
 
III.2.3.2. ICC’s Jurisdiction 
 
The different dimensions of the ICC’s jurisdiction stem from those of the 
States parties; hence, the consolidated ICC’s jurisdiction isn’t but the sum of 
these national jurisdictions, both personal and territorial. States parties have 
thus devolved their jurisdictions to the ICC with regard to some international 
crimes (the so-called “core-crimes”). In principle, all States enjoy under 
general international law (i.e. “universal jurisdiction) a complete jurisdiction 
to prosecute and try war crimes, CAH, genocide as well as crimes against 
peace. Being thus members of the ICC involves the attribution of their 
jurisdiction to the latter. Yet, ICC’s jurisdiction is not as large as of that of 
States parties, insofar as it does not comprise the (passive) personal 
jurisdiction, i.e. the power of the State of the victim’s nationality to 
prosecute and try the authors of the crime regardless of his (or her) 
nationality. Indeed, ICC’s personal jurisdiction (ratione personae) 
encompasses solely the active ones, i.e. the nationality of the author of the 
                                                                                                    
during the Rome conference, was much less when it was faced to a bloody and 
devastating civil war.  
(226) The score was 120 States voting for it, 7 against, and 21 abstaining. 
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crime.(227) In other words, for the ICC to entertain a claim, the State of the 
suspect’s nationality must be party to the ICC Statute. Alongside, with this 
one-dimensional personal jurisdiction, ICC enjoys of course of the territorial 
jurisdiction (ratione loci), i.e. it has jurisdiction if the crime has occurred on 
the territory of one of the States parties to its Statute again independently 
of the nationality of victim and that of the suspect.(228) In sum, for the Court 
to have jurisdiction, only one of these two (hence alternatives) jurisdictional 
criteria has to be met.(229) Hence, ICC may well prosecute and try a suspect 
who is a national of a State which is not party to the ICC Statute provided 
that the crime has been committed on the territory of a State that is party to 
the ICC at the time of its perpetration. (230) This is in fact but what 
international jurists call the territorial dimension of the application of an 
                                      
(227) “The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the 
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that 
vessel or aircraft” (Article 12 (2) a) ICC Statute). 
(228) “The State of which the person accused is of the crime is a national”, (Article 12 
(2) b) ICC Statute).  
(229) During the negotiations, some States endeavoured to further limit ICC’s 
jurisdiction. France, for instance, claimed that both criteria of jurisdiction – territorial 
(locus commissi delicti) and personal (the nationality of the suspect) – had to be 
reunited with a single State party for the ICC to try the suspect. Russian Federation 
argued for a two-fold territorial jurisdiction: the locus commissi delicti and the place of 
the suspect’s arrest had to be the same (i.e. in the same State territory) for the ICC to 
enjoy jurisdiction over the international crime in point. Luckily enough these two 
proposals were rebutted.  
(230) This (sensitive) aspect of the ICC’s jurisdiction has irritated some States, among 
which the USA which has hence manoeuvred to undermine it by concluding bilateral 
treaties with more than one hundred States which are (or are bound to become) 
parties to the ICC. The object and purpose of these almost identical international 
bilateral agreements is precisely to obtain the commitment of these States not to 
surrender US nationals to the ICC without the consent of the USA (e.g. Article 2 of the 
bilateral agreement between USA and Albania, May 2, 2003; 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/guides/article_98.cfm).  Indeed, per 
Article 89 ICC Statute, States parties are under the obligation to surrender to the ICC a 
suspect. True, as Article 98 (2) ICC Statute, “the Court may not proceed with a 
request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently 
with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a 
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the 
Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for 
the surrender”.  
69
Distefano: ????????? ???????? ??????? ?????: ???? ????? ???????? ???????
Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2021




]January  2021  85, Issue No. 35[Year      ]                                                                 104 
 
international treaty (Article 29 VCLT). This is far from being surprising, 
insofar if the ICC had not existed or if the State on whose territory the crime 
was committed was not party to the ICC, then that State would have 
normally enjoyed, by virtue of the principle of universal jurisdiction, the 
power to try and prosecute the (alien) suspect.  
Furthermore, ICC’s jurisdiction may be extended to cover a State’s both 
personal and territorial jurisdiction, even though it is not member of the ICC 
– if this State expresses its consent to this effect according to Article 12 (3). 
Some scholars have criticized this provision on the ground that it would 
allow States to recognize ICC’s jurisdiction à la carte, that it to say only when 
it suits them.  
Finally, ICC’s jurisdiction ratione personae is limited to physical persons 
only (of 18 years old or older)(231) and does not extend to legal corporations 
(contrariwise to the IMT).(232) Another important feature, inherited from the 
IMT and the two ad hoc tribunals was the absolute lack of immunity which 
could shield a suspect from trial and possibly a punishment. Article 27 ICC 
reads indeed as following:  
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as 
a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall 
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction 
of sentence.  
                                      
(231) Article 26 ICC Statute. UK – alongside some African States – strived to lower this 
threshold to 16 years, hence linking this age-limit with that of enrolment in their army.  
(232) Draft ICC Statute envisaged the prosecution and trial of legal corporations; there 
were indeed at least three main reasons underlying the need and usefulness of doing 
so: a) physical persons rarely participate to the reparation of damages whilst legal 
corporations are more often endowed of material resources in this respect; b) since 
the criminal code of numerous States does not allow for their prosecution, ICC’s 
jurisdiction would have filled this gap; c) this additional personal jurisdiction would 
have had a general deterrence effect upon arms dealers and manufactures or those 
corporations involved in the unlawful plundering of national resources during armed 
conflicts, or in any other similar situations such as that of “Radio Mille Collines” in 
Rwanda prompting Hutus to kill Tutsis thus triggering in fact the genocide.  
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2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international 
law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person. (233) 
Ratione temporis, ICC’s jurisdiction applies since the entry into force of 
the Rome Statute vis-à-vis the State party concerned. It then suffices that at 
the moment of the commission of the crime, the State on whose territory it 
has been committed or the State of the suspect’s nationality must be party 
to the ICC Statute.(234) 
Ratione materiae, ICC’s jurisdiction represents to date the most 
successful attempt to codify customary international law(235) with regard to 
the four core international crimes: genocide (Article 6), CAH (Article 7), war 
crimes (Article 8), crime of aggression (Article 8bis).(236)A few words on each 
must be spent in connection with what has already been said in this 
regard.(237)  
                                      
(233) Recently, the regrettable decisions of South Africa, Burundi and Gambia to 
withdraw from the ICC Stature are ostensibly founded on the alleged (though 
inexistent) incompatibility between Article 27 and the Law of State immunities. To so 
pretend would be tantamount to revert to the legal framework before Nuremberg: it’s 
unfortunate.  
(234) Article 24 (1) ICC Statute. However, any State party to the ICC may temporarily 
“opt-out” from the ICC’s jurisdiction: “Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, 
a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven 
years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to 
in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its 
territory. A declaration under this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions 
of this article shall be reviewed at the Review Conference convened in accordance with 
article 123, paragraph 1”. This provision was inserted at the instigation of France.  
(235) It goes without saying that States parties to the ICC have to insert these crimes in 
their criminal codes lest they would give up prosecuting and trying them on the 
municipal plane; failing to do so would make the States completely dependent – for 
their prosecution and trials – from the ICC. 
(236) The definition of this last international crime was inserted in 2010 by a resolution 
adopted the Assembly of States parties convened in Kampala Uganda in accordance 
with Article 5 (2) ICC Statute (resolution RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010).  
(237) It ought to be observed in this connection that the Court will ineluctably be faced 
with some sensitive questions of criminal policy: standardization of charges since the 
substantive criminal acts encompassed are not exactly the same as those provided for 
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With respect to the crime of genocide that is placed at the first rank of 
the international crimes over which ICC may wield its jurisdiction, there is 
not too much to comment except that it is, unsurprisingly, the Xerox-copy of 
the definition enshrined in the 1948 UN Genocide.(238) Regarding CAH, the 
contribution of the ICC Statute is far more substantial. First of all, it dispels 
some doubts insofar as it frees up the commission of a crime against 
humanity from the existence of an armed conflict (be it international or non-
international), by borrowing instead from Article 3 ICTR Statute the formula 
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against” (Article 7 
(1) ICC Statute). Secondly, it appears now more neatly that States have 
definitely rejected the need of a “special intention” (dolus specialis): what is 
instead required is that the author of the crime had “knowledge of the 
attack” (ibid.). Thirdly, Article 7 (2) finally compiles an exhaustive (or near-
to) list of breaches encompassed by this category of international crimes. 
This provision gives besides due attention to the details of these violations; 
something international criminal jurists will be surely happy about. Yet, this 
is not necessarily the case for the usual clause of Article 7 (1) k), a residual 
clause, which provides that “other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health” may likewise be qualified – by the ICC – as CAH.  
Regarding war crimes – in fact the oldest among the four core 
international crimes- Article 8 ICC constitutes the culmination of a lengthy 
development. Its structure is double two-fold, subdivided firstly having 
regard to the international – or not –(239) character of the conflict, and then 
having regard to the object of the breach. With respect to the IAC, it 
encompasses the famous “grave breaches” of the four GE 1949 as well as 
“other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international 
armed conflict” (Article 8 (2) b)). This same skeleton is replicated with regard 
to NIAC, to the extent that war crimes in this connection comprises any 
violation to common Article 3 of the four GE 1949 as well as “other serious 
                                                                                                    
by municipal systems (as well as, sometimes, by international conventions). The same 
applies all the more with regard to penalties.  
(238) A not too strong attempt to include therein genocide against social and political 
groups was outright rejected in Rome.  
(239) The question whether a war crime can be committed during a NIAC is henceforth 
clearly settled since ICTY Appeals Chamber’s judgement in the Tadic case (1995), see 
supra II.1.4. 
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violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character” (Article 8 (2) e)). In both types of armed conflict 
(IAC(240) and NIAC(241)) the use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases” is 
a war crime.(242)  
Finally, regarding the “crime of aggression”, which was considered by 
IMT’s jurisprudence as “the crime of crimes”, it was inserted into the ICC’s 
Statute after its adoption (in fact, as it has been said earlier, even after its 
entry into force). The reasons underlying the postponement of the 
introduction of this category of international crimes within the compass of 
the ICC’s jurisdiction rest not so much on substantive grounds but rather on 
institutional ones, that is to say the relations with the UNSC powers under 
Chapter VII UNC. Article 8bis eventually included in 2010 manages to 
reconcile the respective powers of a UN organ, entrusted with the principal 
responsibility to maintain and restore international peace and security.  And 
of an international judicial body which does not pertain to the UN system. 
Indeed, some legitimate concerns were voiced by the UNSC with respect to 
its powers of defining an act of aggression faced in the context of, for 
instance, a (parallel) judicial finding by the ICC having determined its 
existence or inversely its inexistence. These questions – of which more later 
on – are notably settled in Articles 13, 16 and 18. From the standpoint of 
substantive law, as earlier said, Article 8 bis reproduces verbatim, by 
through an explicit reference, Article 3 of the UNGA resolution 3314 that is 
largely considered as being the faithful reflection of customary international 
law regarding (the crime of) aggression.(243) 
The substantive law as enunciated by Articles 6 to 8 bis for each of the 
four core international crimes is not, by all means, forever frozen – PIL 
evolves as any other legal system – as Article 10 takes care to specify and 
warn:  
                                      
(240) Article 8 (2) b) xviii) 
(241) Article 8 (2) e) xiv) 
(242) Instead, this provision is unsurprisingly less bold – on the grounds of the 
uncertainty reigning in this regard - with respect of the use of nuclear weapons in an 
armed conflict. This is also mirrored by the World Court’s advisory opinion in 1996.  
(243) See supra II.1.3. 
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“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in 
any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes 
other than this Statute”  
Hence, State parties to the ICC may not only amend the ICC Statute – 
that’s one of the functions of the Assembly of States parties (and it has 
already acted this way in respect of the crime of aggression) – but they may 
also conclude treaties or develop customary international law (through their 
opinio iuris) leading thus to a modification of current general international 
law in respect of the definition of (or adjunction of new) international 
crimes. 
  
III.2.3.3. ICC’s Modus operandi  
 
III.2.3.3.1. Criminal proceedings 
 
Some States insisted during the Rome conference that any criminal penal 
action by the ICC should be authorized by the UNSC. This subordination of 
the ICC’s investigative and prosecution actions to the UNSC would have 
paralyzed the Court and was wisely rejected.(244) Hence, the Prosecutor – 
one of the ICC’s organs – may “initiate an investigation” (Article 13) whilst 
the Court (Pre-Trial Chamber) is vested with the power of authorizing or not 
its commencement. This solution guarantees on one side the necessary 
independence of the judicial power from the UNSC (i.e. sort of Executive 
power) while on the other side checking over the Prosecutor’s action 
preventing it to be politically motivated or abused.(245)  
By virtue of Article 13 (a) States may also refer a “situation” to the 
Prosecutor “for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific 
persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes” (Article 14 
(1)). In the same vein, UNSC may too refer a situation as provided by Article 
                                      
(244) It ought to be nonetheless observed that in some countries the executive power 
may defer or even stop an investigation.  
(245) In the same vein, it ought to be noted that the Prosecutor may “upon 
investigation” concludes that the prosecution does not serve the “interests of justice” 
(Article 53 ICC Statute). This may also be construed as an attempt to reconcile, for 
instance, the imperatives of international criminal justice with those stemming from a 
wider need of a transitional justice. UNSC’s power of deferral may also be looked 
through this prism, see infra III.2.3.3.1. 
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13 (b). In brief, according to Article 13, the Court may exercise jurisdiction in 
any situation referred to by a State (a),(246) by the UNSC (b)(247) through the 
investigation of the Prosecutor (c).(248) 
Given the highly sensitive aspects of the crime of aggression, a more 
complex procedure aimed at reconciling States’, UNSC’s and ICC’s powers in 
this regard is established. Article 15 bis and ter indeed provide respectively 
for the procedures to be followed in the case of a referral by a State and by 
the UNSC of a situation characterized by an act of aggression.    
Finally, it seems that ICC Statute takes in due consideration the 
competences and powers of the UNSC under Chapter VII, thus endeavouring 
to fit the action of the ICC into the wider scope of the maintenance of 
international peace and security. In effect, UNSC may, under the Rome 
Statute refer a situation to the Court (Article 13 (b) & 15 ter),(249) even 
though none of the two alternative jurisdictional criteria is met, availing 
itself of its powers under Chapter VII(250) thatare thus unaffected by the 
ICC.(251) Conversely, UNSC may block the prosecution or investigation 
initiated by the Prosecutor for one year (renewable) by adopting a 
resolution to this aim under Chapter VII: 
“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded 
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security 
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
                                      
(246) These States are hitherto exclusively African: Ivory Coast, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. 
(247) UNSC has already availed itself of this power and has heretofore referred two 
situations to the ICC: Libya, (Darfur) Sudan (resolution 1593 (31 March 2005) “to refer 
the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court” (para. 1).  
(248) Under the terms of Article 15 (1), in fact, “The Prosecutor may initiate 
investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court”. 
(249) In so doing the Court will act pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction. 
(250) This seems absolutely consistent with the UNSC powers in this field, for if it can 
create ex novo an ad hoc tribunal it may all the more refer a situation to a pre-existing 
international judicial criminal body. 
(251) Furthermore, by virtue of Article 103 UNC, obligations under the UNC “shall 
prevail” over any other international obligations, save of course obligations stemming 
from ius cogens rules. 
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the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that 
request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions”(252) 
The UNSC power to defer investigation or prosecution – recognized by 
Article 16 ICC – stems from its “principal responsibility” for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. The interest of this provision lay with 
the limitation of the role of the P5 which otherwise might have put their 
veto to the seisin of the Court. However, this power to defer the exercise of 
jurisdiction (investigation or prosecution) by the Court must not be 
overstated since it needs not only the “concurring” (yes, abstention or 
“vacant seat”) of the P5 but also at least four non-permanent UNSC 
members for the resolution to be adopted according to Article 27 UNC.(253) 
To-date only one case may be cited as an example of application of this oft-
criticized provision, by which UNSC eventually bestowed a general immunity 
from the ICC’s jurisdiction all “operations established peace-keeping forces 
or authorized peace-enforcing forces by the United Nations Security 
Council … deployed to maintain or restore international peace and 
security”.(254) Furthermore, this is all the more true shall the UNSC intend to 
extend for another year-term this deferral.  
 
III.2.3.3.2. ICC vis-à-vis States’ concurrent 
Jurisdictions 
 
                                      
(252) Article 16 ICC Statute. 
(253) With regard to the “actual” construction of this major provision relating to voting 
procedures within the UNSC, see: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 249-250. 
(254) Paragraph 2 of the Preamble of UNSC resolution 1422 (12 July 2002); by OP 1 it is 
“requested” to the ICC, “consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel 
from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions 
relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-
month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or 
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;”. This 
general deferral of jurisdiction has already been renewed once. See UNSC Resolution 
395 (25 August 1976) ; and GA Resolution 1142 (XII) and 1361 (XIV), see also Giovanni 
Distefano and Etienne Henry, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Security 
Council: disentangling Themis from Ares’, in: Karine Bannelier, Theodore Christakis and 
Sarah Heathcote (ed.), The ICJ and the Evolution of International Law, Routledge, 2012, 
§ 5.3 (at 67). 
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While the two ad hoc international tribunals – ICTY and ICTR – enjoy a 
primacy over municipal courts in prosecuting and trying those persons 
accused of international crimes falling within their jurisdiction, member 
States of the ICC retain their whole jurisdiction in this respect and are under 
“the duty to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes”.(255) Hence, in the terms of jurisdiction, the relations 
between ICC and its Members may be qualified of “subsidiarity” in lieu of 
primacy to the extent that if the latter initiate an investigation, it has the 
right to oppose that the Court try the suspect (even though if this same 
State concludes that there is no reason to bring a prosecution). This won’t 
apply, nonetheless, if the Court determines this State’s bad faith(256) or 
alternatively its incapacity (“non possumus”) or unwillingness (“non 
volumus”) to try the suspect (Article 17 ICC Statute). This provision – 
enabling States to refer a situation to the ICC – undoubtedly represents the 
backbone of the functioning of the Court with respect to the concurrent 
jurisdictions of Member States. It may be assumed that this clause was 
particularly appreciated and backed by many developing countries that 
considered themselves unable (“non possumus”)(257) or preferred, for other 
reasons such as political or social sensitiveness (“non volumus”), not to 
prosecute and try international crimes encompassed by the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. It falls then to the Court to assess the fulfilment of either two 
situations; in so doing the Court will hence intervene concretely within the 
municipal framework of the national prosecution with a view to assessing 
                                      
(255) Sixth preambular part of the ICC Statute.  
(256) Furthermore, according to the principle general of law “ne bis in idem”, the 
Court may not try a second time a person “with respect to the same conduct unless 
the proceedings in the other court” have been carried out “ a) with the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; or b) were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were 
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to 
bring the person concerned to justice” (Article 20 (3) a), b)). 
(257) Among the reasons why a State would be unable to prosecute and try a person 
suspect of having committed an international crime may lay with the immunity the 
accused would enjoy according to domestic law, for example a Head of State, such it 
has been the case for the President of the Republic of Kenya, accused of CAH and who 
appeared before the ICC on 2014. The Prosecutor eventually withdrew the charges 
against him on December 4, 2014.  
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the real intention of the State in point to prosecute a given international 
crime. The Court will thus make a finding on a national system’s willingness 
or capacity to prosecute and try international crimes.(258)  
Moreover, ICC Statute (Article 17 (1) d))(259) pointedly states that the 
Court has jurisdiction over case of “sufficient gravity”, such as for example 
CAH, “large-scale commission” of war crimes (Article 8 (1)). Hence, the 
principal aim of the ICC Statute is not that of prosecuting and trying any 
international crime, but to allow States to refer to the ICC the gravest 
crimes(260) while at the same time (for any international crime encompassed 
by the ICC Statute) enabling the Court to verify whether States duly abide by 
their obligations under the Rome Statute and general international law.  In 
this respect, the ICC is expected to play the rôle of “watch-dog” towards 
Member States. This provision would then surely encourage (push?) the 
latter to carry out their judicial function on the municipal plane.  
  
III.2.3.3.3. Member States as “control agents” and 
“executive agents” of the ICC 
 
The effective operation of the ICC depends to a large extent from the 
goodwill of its Member States. They are indeed at the same its “control 
agents” and its “executive agents”. With regard to the former, Member 
States are meant to control – through the Assembly of States Parties – ICC’s 
activity (Article 112 ICC Statute); in this context they may be led to confer 
more resources and means of action to the ICC (Article 121 ICC Statute). 
With regard to the second aspect, i.e. “executive agents”, the seat of the ICC 
being at The Hague, States are expected to provide appropriate places of 
detention and imprisonment. Further, since the Court’s funding falls 
inevitably on Member States’ shoulders, this might fuel a perverted relation 
                                      
(258) In this connection, the Court will be led, it is too early to make an assessment 
today, to incidentally develop a jurisprudence on the construction of the concept of 
“due process of law” as envisaged by Article 17 (2). This concept is in fact instrumental 
to trigger its subsidiary jurisdiction with regard to the State’s. 
(259) In addition, 4th PP of the ICC Statute refers to the “most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community”. 
(260) Contrariwise to the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals which, at least 
initially, were endowed with the mandate of prosecuting and trying any international 
crimes within their jurisdiction.  
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with some of the Member States at some point with the risk of affecting the 
Court’s activity. In this connection, one does not have to forget that ICC 
does not have judicial police; hence it will rely on States’ goodwill to collect 
evidence, arrest suspects, search and bring witnesses, etc. True, by virtue of 
the pre-eminence of the Court over the requested State, hence unlike to the 
classical system of international judicial cooperation between States, 
requested States are under the obligation to carry out the request made by 
the Court. If they do not – and it is for the Court to make such a finding – 
then ICC may refer the problem for further action either to the Assembly of 
States Parties or to the UNSC, if the situation in point has been referred by it 
to the Court under Article 13 (b) ICC Statute. However, in both cases the 
latter instrument does not provide for any specific sanction.(261) Moreover, if 
the requested cooperation affects State’s “national security” (Article 72 ICC 
Statute), then the procedure becomes far more heavy and complicated with 
the risk of a substantial loss of time for the Court.(262) 
                                      
(261) Of course, UNSC may avail of its general powers under Chapter VII in order to 
make the recalcitrant State to comply with the ICC Statute and Court’s order.  
(262) This argument is likely to be raised notably in connection with the commission of 
war crimes “where the disclosure of the information or documents of a State would, in 
the opinion of that State, prejudice its national security interest” (Article 72 (1) ICC 
Statute).  
79
Distefano: ????????? ???????? ??????? ?????: ???? ????? ???????? ???????
Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2021




]January  2021  85, Issue No. 35[Year      ]                                                                 114 
 
A. Research References: 
 A. Cassese, D. Scalia, & al., Les grands arrêts du droit 
international pénal, 2th ed., Paris, 2020 ; 
 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil, New York, 1963; 
 Ph. Sands, East West Street. On the Origins of Genocide and 
Crimes against Humanity, London, 2016; 
 The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, ed. 
by A. Casses & al., Oxford, 2009; 
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A 
Commentary, ed. by A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, R.W.D. Jones, 
Oxford, 2002; 
 The UN Genocide Convention. A Commentary, ed. by P. 
Gaeta, Oxford, 2009. 
80
Journal Sharia and Law, Vol. 2021, No. 85 [2021], Art. 10
https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2021/iss85/10




115                                                                                 [College of  Law UAE University] 
 
 
 قفزة نوعية إلنسانية اإلنسان املسؤولية اجلنائية الدولية للفرد:
  :جيوفاين ديستيفانو د. أ.
 حصل عىل درجة الدكتوراه يف العالقات الدولية ختصص القانون الدويل من املعهد العايل للدراسات الدولية يف جنيف. 
يعمل أستاذًا يف كلية احلقوق بجامعة نيوشاتيل. كام كان أستاًذا زائًرا يف أكاديمية القانون الدويل اإلنساين  2009منذ فرباير 
اين ديستيفانو سابًقا يف التدريس يف جامعات جنيف ولوزان وكاتانيا )إيطاليا( والعني عمل جيوف وحقوق اإلنسان )جنيف(. 
واستخدام القوة يف  "القانون الدويل للمساحات"مشاريعه احلالية هي  )باريس(.  IHEI)اإلمارات العربية املتحدة( ومعهد 
 .العالقات الدولية
 :غة العربيةباللامللخص 
ليست فصاًل جديًدا من القانون الدويل فإن املسؤولية اجلنائية الدولية  الصحيح،باملعنى 
شهدنا  القريب،بل هي إعادة إحياء مؤخًرا لفصل قديم من قانون األمم. يف املايض  العام،
ذات اختصاص حمدود، عىل النحو املنصوص عليه يف  خمصصة،ظهور حماكم جنائية دولية 
تتمتع املحكمة اجلنائية الدولية اليوم، ضمن  ذلك،. وبدالً من (263)أنظمتها األساسية
وبالتايل فهي جهاز دائم ذو طابع عام،  عامة؛بوالية قضائية  (،حدودها القانونية )املعاهدة
يعكس حمكمة العدل الدولية يف مسائل القانون اجلنائي الدويل. كام سيكون مسؤوالً عن 
 املسؤولية اجلنائية الدولية لألفراد.
 "االلتزامات"سنتعامل هنا مع  ،"احلق"بناًء عىل  السابقني،عىل النقيض من النهجني 
نح  أي االلتزامات الدولية بعدم ارتكاب بعض األفعال التي توصف بأهنا  للفرد،التي ُتم
يتعامل قانون العزل السيايس مع األفراد من خالل  .األممقانون  (يوريس جنتيوم)جريمة 
اجلرائم. لذلك يتم تفسري الفرد عىل أنه الذات السلبية يف العالقات  حظر ارتكاب مثل هذه
 -أمام املحاكم البلدية والدولية عىل حد سواء  -جيب عليه أن حياسب  الدولية؛القانونية 
عن أفعاله السيئة )انتهاك االلتزامات الدولية( املرتكبة ضد الدول وكذلك األفراد 
 اإلنسان،من زاوية احلامية الدولية حلقوق  سؤولية،املإذا كانت  وبالتايل، (264)اآلخرين.
                                      
 يوغوسالفيا السابقة ورواندا املثال،عىل سبيل  (263)
قع جتاه األشخاص الذين عانوا )أو   (264) وجتدر اإلشارة إىل أن املسؤولية اجلنائية الدولية للفرد ال يتم تكبدها يف الوا
أي  السابقني،نفس املعادلة يف املنظورين  املقلوبة،ولكن مع األدوار  أخرى،تأثروا( بالفعل بارتكاب جريمته. هنا نجد مرة 
 ملترضر( والفرد )الطرف املتخلف(.الدولة أو املجتمع الدويل )الطرف ا
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 تمعترب الشخصية سلبية. احلالة،يف هذه  نشطة،تنطوي عىل شخصية 
الدولية للدول التي ال يزال وجودها بحاجة إىل النظر  "اجلرائم"برصف النظر عن 
ا أفراد فإن القانون الدويل يفكر يف وجود فئات معينة من اجلرائم التي يرتكبه بعناية،
فإن عدًدا قلياًل فقط  ذلك،. ومع (265)يترصفون إما بشكل فردي أو كأجهزة تابعة للدولة
بينام ال تتم مقاضاة  الدويل،من هذه االنتهاكات عرضة للمقاضاة واملعاقبة عىل املستوى 
 ومعاقبة اآلخرين إال من قبل السلطات القضائية الوطنية.
قاطعة قانون العزل السيايس منذ النصف الثاين تمظهر التطورات الثورية التي ختللت م
والتي تدخلت بشدة يف أحد العنارص األساسية للمجال  فصاعًدا،من القرن العرشين 
املحجوز للدولة )للقمع اإلجرامي( أنه جيب أيًضا اعتبار الفرد موضوًعا دولًيا. يف هذا 
 قضائية دولية.رشيطة أن تتم مقاضاته وحماكمته مبارشة من قبل آلية  املجال،
عىل مستوى العقوبة الدولية عىل هذه اجلرائم نشأ الفرد يف القانون الدويل  الواقع،يف 
من املهم  أخرًيا،. (266)وبالتايل كموضوع للقانون الدويل الدولية،كحامل لاللتزامات 
عىل املسؤولية  األشكال،بأي شكل من  تؤثر،مالحظة أن املسؤولية اجلنائية للفرد ال 
ازدواجية "فإن  ذلك،بل عىل العكس من  املطاف،الدولية املصاحبة للدولة يف هناية 
. والواقع أنه إذا كان من (267)"املسؤولية هذه تظل سمة ثابتة من سامت القانون الدويل
فيمكن عندئٍذ حتميل الدولة  ،(268)بأخرىاملمكن أن يمنسب سلوكها إىل دولة بطريقة أو 
                                      
 انظر:   (265)
 G. Distefano ،Fundamentals of Public International Law . 
 .702-700 ص 2019ليدن،  الدويل،رسم ختطيطي للنظام القانوين 
  انظر: (266)
 G. Balladore Pallieri ،1962 ،pp.21-222 ؛ 
أي  -)منذ أن تم الوفاء بالرشط الذي قدمه هذا الفقهي الشهري  408-407، ص 1968؛ كوادري، 77-76ص  ،1933 رومانو،س. 
ئم الدولية عىل املستوى الدويل  ؛ 81-79، ص  2001كاسيزي ،  (؛وجود هيئات دولية تتمتع بسلطة قمع هذه اجلرا
 A. Verdross ،B. Simma ،1984 ،§§ 430-443 (pp.260-267)؛ 
 النظام من 4 الفقرة 25 املادة انظر(. 116 يف) 173 §، 2007اتفاقية منع جريمة اإلبادة اجلامعية واملعاقبة عليها،  تطبيق   (267)
، التي تنص عىل ما ييل: "ال ختل هذه املواد بأي مسألة تتعلق باملسؤولية IR 2001 58 املادة وكذلك الدولية اجلنائية للمحكمة األسايس
 الدويل ألي شخص يترصف نيابة عن دولة".الفردية بموجب القانون 
  :انظر (268)
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ستكون هناك مسؤوليتان دوليتان )الفرد والدولة( يف  فصاعًدا،دولية. من اآلن املسؤولية ال



















                                                                                                    
: G: Distefano ،2019 ،pp.653-695. 
تتحمل الدولة ومن يترصفون باسمها املسؤولية اجلنائية عن انتهاكات القانون الدويل بسبب خطورهتا ، وخطورهتا ، وازدراءهم " (269)
القانون عموًما الدول املتحرضة "، قانون أوبنهايم الدويل ، الطبعة الثامنة. للحياة البرشية ، وتضعهم يف فئة األفعال اإلجرامية كام يفهمها 
 .355 ص. (،)السري هريش لوترباخت
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